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Extraterritorial Financial Regulation:
Why E.T. Can’t Come Home

by John C. Coffee, Jr. *

*
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Introduction
This Article begins with a deliberately off-putting title: extraterritorial financial
regulation. Old-time “conflict of laws” scholars would call this an oxymoron, pointing to
recent Supreme Court decisions—most notably, Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd.1 and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,2—that have applied a strong
presumption against extraterritoriality to curb the reach of U.S. law. Even those
international law scholars who are sympathetic to the regulation of multinational
financial institutions might prefer to avoid this term and talk instead of “global financial
regulation,” because they conceptualize international financial regulation as implemented
through networks of cooperating multinational institutions, applying broad principles of

1

561 U.S. ___,130 S.Ct. 2869 (2010).

2

569 U.S. ___,133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013).
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“soft law” on a consensual basis.3 Both perspectives, however, miss much, and the
unfashionable word—“extraterritorial”—cannot be avoided.4
3

See David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J.

INT’L LAW 683, 687 (2012) (“[T]he international [financial] regulatory architecture is one
that has been devised by domestic agencies acting through international networks, and
can at best be characterized as "soft"—that is, nonbinding—law.”). See also infra notes
68–70 and accompanying text. “Soft law” has many definitions, but a key factor is that it
is generally non-binding (although there may be costs for non-compliance). For a good
overview, see CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 111–14 (2012).
4

Several authors have recognized that the new emphasis on “soft” law, implemented

through international cooperation, represents an effort by national regulators to find some
remaining means in a globalizing world to assert authority over mobile market
participants. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, Territoriality as a Regulatory Technique: Notes
from the Financial Crisis, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 499, 501 (2010) (suggesting a “framework
for viewing the role of national regulators as sources of international financial law”).
Others have argued that the new emphasis on “mutual recognition” and global
competitiveness is often a rhetoric used to mask an agenda that advances “interest group
[politics]” for the benefit of key business constituencies. See Steven M. Davidoff,
Rhetoric and Reality: A Historical Perspective on the Regulation of Foreign Private
Issuers, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 619, 620 (2010). Still others have defended the broad
extraterritorial scope of the Dodd-Frank Act as necessary to protect U.S. taxpayers. See
Michael Greenberger, The Extraterritorial Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act Protects
-3-
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Why not? Four basic reasons will be given: First, major financial institutions are
extremely mobile and can easily park their higher-risk operations abroad and beyond the
regulatory reach of their home country, unless extraterritorial authority is recognized.
Second, to regulate systemic risk meaningfully, one must regulate not only domestic
financial institutions, but often their counterparties as well. This is because major
financial institutions are not only “too big to fail,” but also “too interconnected to fail.”
Third, some nations will find it in their interest to profit from regulatory arbitrage by
offering underregulated havens—i.e., “financial casinos” in this Essay’s terminology.5

U.S. Taxpayers from Worldwide Bailouts, 80 UMKC L. REV. 965, 985 (2012). Although
this author shares areas of agreement with each of these authors, this Article will attempt
to draw distinctions in the terms of the need for an extraterritorial approach.
5

Even proponents of “soft law” rulemaking have recognized that in the case of “systemic

risk” regulation, the costs and benefits of regulation fall very differently on different
jurisdictions. Thus, Professor Chris Brummer writes:
“Some countries may, for example, be net exporters of
‘bad’ financial products . . . to foreign investors. In such
instances, countries will have few incentives to cooperate
and adopt more stringent regulatory standards. Similarly,
some smaller, capital-poor countries may have few other
means than weak regulations to attract capital. Without a
better alternative for attracting financial transactions, they
may be incentivized to hope for the best and maintain
weaker standards, because they have ‘nothing to lose’ with
regard to the rules they adopt.”

See Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99
GEO. L.J. 257, 270 (2011) [hereinafter “How International Financial Law Works”]. This
-4-

These nations, the financial services industry, and still other nations that are essentially
passive or indifferent will resist strong “soft law” standards, preferring to keep “soft law”
aspirational and ineffable. Fourth and finally, the best way to get to adequate “soft law”
standards may be through the assertion of extraterritorial authority by the major financial
nations in order for them to gain the leverage necessary to spur the promulgation of
meaningful “soft law” standards by international bodies that will otherwise be slow to act
in the absence of high consensus. Thus, this assertion of extraterritorial authority can be
viewed as an interim stage in the eventual development of meaningful “soft law”
standards.
In any event, both the United States and the E.U. have asserted such
extraterritorial authority, particularly with regard to over-the-counter (“OTC”)
derivatives. In the United States, this has been done by explicit Congressional directions
in the Dodd-Frank Act that overrode the presumption against extraterritoriality.6 In so

Essay agrees that many nations may prefer to maintain weak regulation (i.e., to run
“financial casinos”) because they have “nothing to lose.” Id. In general, capital-poor
countries tend not to bear the risks of financial contagion and hence have less incentive to
cooperate to reduce those risks.
6

In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010), the Supreme

Court proclaimed that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
application, it has none.” Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2878. But the Dodd-Frank Act
repeatedly indicates that it is to apply extraterritorially. In the case of swaps, Title VII
contains an explicit reference to extraterritorial application in Section 722(d) of the
Dodd-Frank Act. See notes 31–32 infra and accompanying text. Moreover, the
-5-

doing, Congress was responding to the challenge posed by the 2008 collapse of American
International Group, Inc. (“AIG”), then the largest insurance company in the United
States, whose sudden insolvency in 2008 in the face of margin calls from its
counterparties overshadowed even the failure of Lehman Brothers and eventually
Morrison Court also rejected any need for a “clear statement” rule and agreed that
context counts. Morrison, 130 S.Ct. at 2883 (“[W]e do not say . . . that the presumption
against extraterritoriality is a ‘clear statement rule,’ if by that is meant a requirement that
a statute say ‘this law applies abroad.’ Assuredly context can be consulted as well.”
(internal citations omitted)).
The Dodd-Frank Act also addressed the SEC’s authority to sue on an
extraterritorial basis for securities fraud. Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act added
both Section 27(b) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 22(c) to the
Securities Act of 1933 to restore the Second Circuit’s former “conduct or effects” test
(but only for SEC, not private, actions). See Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1862–63 (July 21, 2010) (spelling out these changes). To date, cases have
divided on whether Section 929P(b) did effectively achieve its purpose. Compare SEC v.
Gruss, 859 F. Supp. 2d 653, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding that Section 929P did restore
SEC’s jurisdiction to assert Rule 10b-5 extraterritorially) with SEC v. A Chicago
Convention Ctr., L.L.C., No. 13 C 982, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109936 at *7, 32–33
(N.D. Ill. August 6, 2013) (finding that Section 929P does not necessarily restore the
prior Second Circuit case law, without deciding the question). [ER 1] This topic is
beyond the scope of this Article, which examines only substantive financial regulation,
not antifraud litigation.
-6-

necessitated a U.S. governmental bailout of $182.5 billion in loans to it.7 Operating in
opaque and unregulated OTC derivatives markets, neither AIG nor its counterparties
required the other to post margin as collateral for their obligations, even though (i) credit
default swaps were inherently long-term obligations that exposed both sides to substantial
credit risk, and (ii) much shorter-term trading transactions on exchanges would have been
often subject to regulatory requirements that necessitated the posting of collateral. As a
result, when AIG’s position on the brink of insolvency became evident in 2008, its
counterparties belatedly made margin calls that were well beyond AIG’s ability to
comply. Faced with the threat of a likely world-wide financial contagion if AIG were
also forced into bankruptcy, the U.S. Government responded by extending credit to it and
guaranteeing its obligations to its counterparties. To an angry Congress, the lessons of the
AIG debacle were multiple: (1) enormous liabilities could be hidden in non-transparent
OTC markets; (2) subsidiaries and affiliates of major U.S.-based financial institutions
could take on an unacceptable level of risk through offshore activities (as AIG had done
through an unregulated U.K. subsidiary); and (3) major market participants could persist
7

For a good overview of this bailout, see William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66

WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 945 (2009). For contemporary accounts of the federal
government’s intervention at AIG, which occurred just three days after Lehman’s
bankruptcy, see Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bids to Halt Financial Crisis Reshape Landscape
of Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A1; Eric Dash and Andrew Ross Sorkin,
Throwing a Lifeline to a Troubled Giant, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2008 at C1. For the $185
billion figure, see Joe Nocera, Hearings That Aren’t Just Theater, N.Y. TIMES, July 3,
2010 at B1.
-7-

in the unrealistic perception that they were protected against risk because of de facto
insurance purchased in this OTC market. In short, even more than the Lehman
bankruptcy, the AIG debacle demonstrated the dangers of regulatory arbitrage and the
need for controls on systemic risk.
Congress also recognized that large financial institutions would likely again
pursue regulatory arbitrage (once the dust settled) and that international standards curbing
systemic risk were largely lacking. Worse yet, meaningful reform on the international
level faced interminable delays before a sufficient international consensus could be
reached. Like the Holy Grail, international consensus is more sought than discovered,
and the quest might continue indefinitely. Knowing all this, Congress opted for an
extraterritorial reach for much of the Dodd-Frank Act.7a
In a much quieter fashion, the E.U. has reached a similar recognition and has also
asserted extraterritorial authority. Here, a major irony surfaces: although the U.S. has
received considerable criticism for its expressly extraterritorial approach, the E.U. has
adopted a nearly equivalent position with regard to OTC derivatives in almost identical
language.8
7a

8

See Greenberger, supra note 4, at 968–69.

Although critics of U.S. policy and U.S. banking lobbyists regularly portray U.S.

financial regulators as uniquely and arrogantly applying our law extraterritorially, the
E.U. has actually done much the same and over the same time period. The basic E.U.
legal regime for cross-border swaps trading is set forth in the European Market
Infrastructure Regulation (“EMIR”), which was adopted in 2012 and is further discussed
infra at note 51. Much like Dodd-Frank, EMIR will also regulate trades between non-8-

This assessment does not deny that the assertion of extraterritorial authority will
produce friction. Such friction was abundantly evident in recent negotiations between the
U.S. and Europe over the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act’s reforms, particularly
with respect to cross-border swaps. On the U.S. side, fear was expressed that, absent
broad extraterritorial coverage, major financial institutions could simply park their
higher-risk operations outside the U.S. and thereby effectively escape the principal
E.U. entities when such trading has a “‘direct, substantial and foreseeable effect’ within
the E.U. or where to do so is necessary to guard against anti-evasion.” See Shearman &
Sterling LLP, United States: Actions Required Under Derivative Reforms, MONDAQ.COM
(Aug. 6, 2013). This language largely parallels the language in Section 722(d) of the
Dodd-Frank Act. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. For a detailed and somewhat
critical review of EMIR and related initiatives, see Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Saguato,
Reforming Securities and Derivatives Trading in the E.U.: From EMIR to MIFIR, 13 J.
CORP. L. STUD. 319, 357–59 (2013).
ESMA, the European securities regulator, published a consultation paper on July
17, 2013, regarding the standards that it would use to prevent the evasion of EMIR by
non-E.U. counterparties, which action again parallels the issuance of similar interpretive
guidance by the CFTC and the SEC. ESMA’s paper is open to comment and consultation
until September 16, 2013. Thus, this is a continuing story.
Still, the key point here is that the E.U. and the U.S. are following very similar,
parallel courses of actions, both looking to the impact of extraterritorial trading on their
own jurisdiction and the potential for evasion. See infra notes 29 to 34 and
accompanying text.
-9-

reforms intended by the Dodd-Frank Act.9 On the European side, there was equivalent
concern that the U.S. approach ignored national sovereignty and represented an alleged
return to a prior tradition of U.S. imperialism under which the U.S. assumed that its
preferred financial practices could be mandated for the rest of the world.10
9

At the open meeting of the CFTC on July 12, 2013, at which the “cross border final

guidance” was approved, CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler emphasized in his initial
statement the danger that large U.S. financial institutions could and did trade through offshore subsidiaries and affiliates, particularly ones organized in unregulated jurisdictions,
such as the Cayman Islands. Specifically, he stressed in this statement that:
(1) “the U.S.’s largest banks each have somewhere between 2,000 and 3,000 legal entities
around the globe”; (2) some U.S. banks “have hundreds of them just in the Cayman
Islands alone”; (3) “Lehman Brothers [had] its 3,300 legal entities”; (4) Citigroup’s
“structured investment vehicles . . . were set up in the Cayman Islands, run out of
London;” and (5) Bear Stearns’ “sinking hedge funds . . . were organized in the
jurisdiction of the Cayman Islands.” See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N,
OPEN MEETING TO CONSIDER CROSS-BORDER FINAL GUIDANCE AND CROSS-BORDER
PHASE-IN EXEMPTIVE ORDER 9–11 (2013).
10

By 2012, some in the financial press were asserting that “[t]he United States is coming

to be seen as a global threat, acting unilaterally with aggressive new market rules . . .
[with] [t]he new buzzword . . . [being] ‘extraterritoriality,’ or ET.” See Huw Jones, ET,
the New Alien Scaring Global Markets, REUTERS, Feb. 5, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/05/us-financial-regulation-etidUSTRE8140DV20120205. As late as September, 2013, the European press was
-10-

Nonetheless, compromises were reached—imperfect and provisional though they
were. Throughout this bruising and hard-nosed negotiation process, the major
international networking institutions—the IMF, the World Bank, the Basel Committee,
IOSCO and the Financial Stability Board11—remained largely on the sidelines, with the
real bargaining being between U.S. regulators and an E.U. Commissioner.12 That

continuing to warn that CFTC “imperialism” was threatening a global deal. See Tom
Braithwaite and Michael McKenzie, U.S. Rules Endanger Derivatives Reforms,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 27, 2013 at p. 1. [ER 2] Some respected U.S. commentators
have agreed with this assessment that the CFTC has overreached. See Edward F. Greene
and Ilona Potiha, Issues in the Extraterritorial Application of Dodd-Frank’s Derivatives
and Clearing Rules, the Impact on Global Markets and the Inevitability of Cross-Border
and U.S. Domestic Coordination, 8 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 338 (2013) [hereinafter
“Issues in the Extraterritorial Application of Dodd-Frank”]. This author agrees as to the
need in particular for U.S. and European coordination, but believes that the concept of
“substituted compliance” is too empty of substantive content to be the guiding light for
that process.
11

For a recent overview of these “transnational” bodies, see Stavros Gadinis, The

Financial Stability Board: The New Politics of International Financial Regulation, 48
TEXAS INT’L L.J. 157, 158–61 (2013).
12

Commissioner Michel Barnier, the European Commissioner for Internal Markets and

Services, was the point person negotiating with the CFTC on behalf of Europe. See Press
Release, CFTC, The European Commission and the CFTC Reach a Common Path
-11-

bargaining centered on a new concept that is still unique to this financial regulatory
context: “substituted compliance.”13 Under it, the critical question becomes whether
U.S. law and the host country’s law are “functionally equivalent.”13a If they are, U.S.based entities, acting extraterritorially, are deemed to comply with U.S. law by
complying instead with the host country’s law. Such an approach still involves an
assertion of “extraterritorial” authority (as U.S. law would preempt the host country’s law
if the two bodies of law were not deemed “functionally equivalent”), but it is far more
palatable and has been enthusiastically supported in Europe and elsewhere. Still, its
growing acceptance necessarily leads to further questions: What are the costs of
substituted compliance? Despite its eager, even euphoric, acceptance within the financial
services community and abroad, this Article will assert that the concept has not yet
received the critical scrutiny it needs. Sometimes, its costs may outweigh its benefits.
Forward on Derivatives (July 11, 2013), available at
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6640-13. [ER 3]
13

For articles introducing and advocating this concept, see Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J.

Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International
Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31 (2007); Edward F. Greene & Ilona Potiha,
Examining the Extraterritorial Reach of Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule and Margin Rules
for Uncleared Swaps—A Call for Regulatory Coordination and Cooperation, 7 CAPITAL
MARKETS L.J. 271 (2012) [hereinafter “Examining the Extraterritorial Reach of DoddFrank’s Volcker Rule”]; see also Greene & Potiha, Issues in the Extraterritorial
Application of Dodd-Frank, supra note 10.
13a

See Greene & Potiha, Issues in the Extraterritorial Application of Dodd-Frank, supra
note 10, at 338.
-12-

Equally important, the attitude of U.S. financial regulators towards “substituted
compliance” has approached the schizophrenic. Unlike securities and derivatives
regulators, banking regulators have largely ignored or disdained substituted compliance,
preferring to rely on a more traditional territorial approach.14 This disparity also needs
justification.
Beyond this initial question of the costs and benefits associated with substituted
compliance, the broader issue that this Article addresses is how successful international
collaboration among nations can best be achieved on financial regulation.
Unquestionably, such collaboration is needed, and an “imperialistic” approach by the
U.S. would be resisted. For some time, the consensus among students of international
relations was to rely on “soft law” with respect to issues of financial regulation—that is,
broad, non-compulsory, and sometimes aspirational, principles that are announced by
international bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. But the
2008 financial crisis required quicker and more forceful action than the processes of soft
law can achieve.
Today, there is an alternative: “minilateralism.”15 As opposed to
“multilateralism,” minilateralism asks what is the smallest number of nations needed to
reach a workable solution to a specific problem. While a multilateral agreement may
take a decade or more to negotiate (if the process is successful),16 a “minilateral” solution

14

See infra at notes 68 to 73 and accompanying text (discussing the Volcker Rule).
This term was coined by Moises Naim, the long-time editor of FOREIGN POLICY. See
Moises Naim, “Minilateralism: The magic number to get real international action,” FOREIGN
POLICY (June 18, 2009) (available at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/18/minilateralism).
16
Moises Naim notes, for example, that the “last successful multilateral trade agreement dates
back to 1994” and the “last significant international nonproliferation agreement was in 1995.” Id.
15

-13-

can come much quicker through bilateral or limited multilateral negotiation. This Article
will assert the superiority of a “minilateral” approach to issues of financial regulation. In
its view, “soft law’ processes will not work when the financial services industry wishes to
resist reform and when other nations benefit from regulatory arbitrage. Thus, the recent
cross-border swaps drama will likely play out again—sometimes with different
participants, sometimes with results, but usually with the same clash of interests.
This preference for a “minilateral” approach and the retention of a measure of
“extraterritorial” financial regulation rests in part on skepticism about the slow pace and
imprecise generalities of “soft law,” which rarely will confine a determined financial
services industry. Even more, it rests on the fact that only the major financial nations
have the right incentives to control systemic risk.13d The major financial nations—mainly
the U.S. and Europe—did suffer from the 2008 crisis, while other nations with less
developed financial infrastructures largely escaped damage.13e This distinction is relevant
because those countries most injured in the 2008 contagion should be more motivated to
prevent a repetition, while those that escaped injury may be more interested in profiting
from regulatory arbitrage. To be sure, the proponents of soft law may insist that the U.S.
13d

See Brummer, How International Financial Law Works, supra note 5 at 309

(“[W]ealthier developed countries generally have more at stake in complex financial rule
making.”).
13e

See Bruno Wenn, Exceedingly High Interest Rates, DANDC.EU (Jan. 25, 2013),

available at http://www.dandc.eu/en/article/european-bank-regulators-would-do-welllearn-their-latin-american-counterparts (noting that “developing countries and emerging
countries [fared] surprisingly well in the [2008 financial] crisis”). [ER 4]
-14-

can no longer rule the world, and some of them will add that, even if Dodd-Frank gives
U.S. regulators authority to regulate on an extraterritorial basis, the U.S. cannot
effectively exercise that authority in the face of unified international opposition.13f To
some extent, this is true. Aggressive U.S. attempts at extraterritorial regulation have
failed in the past (most notably in the antitrust context).17

13f

See, e.g., Greene & Potiha, Issues in the Extraterritorial Application of Dodd-Frank,

supra note 10, at 341–42 (explaining how the approach of the CFTC in Dodd-Frank,
which was “initially perceived to be aggressive . . . led to the unusual development of
countries and foreign regulators commenting publicly and critically to U.S. agencies,”
forcing the CFTC to respond with “updated approaches.”).
17

Several decades ago, the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act (principally

through private antitrust litigation) led to the passage of blocking laws and “claw-back”
legislation in Europe and elsewhere, which legislation was intended to nullify the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law. See, e.g., P.C.F. Pettit & C.J.D. Styles,
The International Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust
Laws, 37 BUS. LAW 697 (1982) (surveying such legislation); John H. Chung, The
International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 and the Maelstrom
Surrounding the Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act, 69 TEMPLE L. REV. 371
(1996) (summarizing the development of Sherman Act jurisdictional issues in U.S courts
and critical responses). Cf. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 382, 385 (N.
D. Ill. 1979) (noting that nine foreign defendants failed to appear, answer, or plead to the
antitrust complaint). That episode involved, however, a more extreme clash between the
-15-

Still, the U.S. is not likely to attempt to ride roughshod over the rest of the world.
Instead, it appears increasingly likely that a compromise will be reached through the
interpretation of the new doctrine of “substituted compliance.” “Substituted compliance”
remains, however, a new and elusive concept whose proper application lies largely in the
eye of the beholder. At worst, it could enable the financial services industry to achieve
an effective end run around the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirements. Conversely, as will be
seen, the Federal Reserve Board has largely disdained the concept, and the newly
adopted Volcker Rule takes no note of it, relying instead on traditional territorial concepts
by which to divide regulatory authority.18
Against this unsettled backdrop, this Article will advance two contentions: First,
for substituted compliance to work, the ground rules on what is allowable must be set by
those nations with the right incentives—namely, those that are truly exposed to systemic
risk. Second, because they do have the right incentives, the U.S. and the E.U. need to be
proactive in opening such a “minilateral” dialogue to define what should constitute
sufficient functional equivalence to satisfy “substantial compliance.” Procedurally, they
should first agree and then approach other major players to sign onto their standards,
rather than await a global consensus and universal harmonization. Why? Economically,
the U.S. and the E.U. have the best incentives for controlling systemic risk because they
will likely bear the lion’s share of the costs from a financial contagion (and thus they will
invest more in controls to avoid one). Other nations can largely avoid those costs. As a
substantive policies of the U.S. and its principal allies than anything posed by existing
differences in derivative regulation.
18

See infra notes 73–90 and accompanying text.
-16-

result, if the world must wait for all nations to converge on a single, universal standard,
the likely end product will be delayed, weaker, and easier to evade.19
The foregoing arguments for a minilateral approach that stresses bilateral
negotiations and binding law rest on an economic foundation that needs to be stated at the
outset. Somewhat naively, the proponents of soft law have tended to view financial
regulation as simpler than other forms of international regulation and as presenting mere
coordination problems.20 This overlooks the very strong incentives for regulatory
19

To this point, the U.S. has avoided placing the topic of financial regulation reform on

the table for international negotiation, in particular by refusing to include it on the agenda
for currently ongoing international trade talks. The Financial Times reports that the U.S.
has resisted “including a framework for financial regulatory convergence in the talks”
because of a concern that “the talks could be used by banks to circumvent tough rules
stemming from the 2010 Dodd-Frank law, and as a way for Europeans to delay their own
reforms.” See James Politi & Alex Barker, White House Set for Wall Street Clash Over
Trade Talks, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 8, 2013 at p. 1.
20

International law scholars have conceptualized international financial law as presenting

simply a “coordination problem” because they assume that national financial regulators
share the same purposes and premises. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Zaring,
Networking Goes International: An Update, 2 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 211, 217–20
(2006). Similarly-minded academics often make the assumption that international
financial law is an area of “low politics.” See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of
International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of
International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 5, 28–29 (2002). But once we recognize that
-17-

arbitrage. Financial regulation has distributional consequences, and different legal rules
create different winners and losers. Moreover, because non-binding “soft law” is
unenforceable, it is easier for an adversely affected nation to defect and ignore its prior
commitments.17a As a result, to expect “soft law” to be kind and gentle and to give each
nation an equal voice is to state rules that ensure it will be ineffective.
Ultimately, systemic risk presents a classic “public goods” problem.21 All nations
want systemic stability, but most would prefer that others pay the cost of maintaining it.

international financial law has distributive consequences, these premises become
untenable. For a critique of these views, see Brummer, How International Financial Law
Works, supra note 5, at 260–61. See also infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
17a

See Brummer, How International Financial Law Works, supra note 5, at 271 (noting

that “soft law should provide little utility as a means for making credible commitments”
because nations will defect from informal commitments when it is in their interest to do
so).
21

For an overview of the economics of public goods, see William H. Oakland, Theory of

Public Goods in 3 A HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 485, 485–99, 502–22 (Alan J.
Auerbach & Martin Feldstein, eds. 1987); see also Mancur Olson, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 14 (1971). By
definition, public goods share at least two characteristics: (1) they are “nonexcludable,”
meaning that producers cannot provide their benefits to one consumer without providing
it to others, and (2) consumption by one consumer does not reduce the supply available
for others. The classic textbook example of a public good is the lighthouse: no one can
be excluded from using it, and use by one does not affect the supply for others. Because
-18-

Unless compelled, many nations would rather “free ride,” looking to the U.S. and the
E.U. in the event of a financial contagion to again fund the costs of a global bailout to
forestall a global depression. Clearly, a financial contagion anywhere in the world could
spread across borders and affect all major markets. But not all nations need to internalize
the costs of a systemic risk crisis, as its impact is uneven.22 In addition, a nation that
persists with laxer, more permissive rules may be able to attract business and profit as a

those who enjoy public goods do not necessarily pay for them, public goods cannot be
easily financed by the private market, as “free riders” can escape payment. To finance
public goods, these free riders must be taxed. Cf. id. at 14–15. In our context, protection
against systemic risk benefits all (to varying degrees), but the costs do not fall equally or
proportionally and are avoided by the “free riders.”
22

Smaller nations without large financial institutions based in them have less to fear from

financial contagion. Even some major nations—Australia, Canada, Brazil, Japan—
suffered much less from the 2008–2009 financial contagion than did the U.S. and the
E.U. See, e.g., Chris Zappone, Australia Dodges Recession, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
June 3, 2009, available at www.smh.com.au/business/australia-dodges-recession20090603-buyq.html; cf. Bulent Gokay, The 2008 World Economic Crisis: Global Shifts
and Faultlines, GLOBAL RESEARCH, Feb. 15, 2009, www.globalresearch.ca/the-2008world-economic-crisis-global-shifts-and-faultlines/12283 (comparing the effects of the
2008 financial crisis on different economies). [ER 5] In this light, CFTC Chairman
Gensler’s repeated focus on the Cayman Islands (see note 9, supra) at least identifies a
legitimate problem (even if it is unlikely that trading in OTC derivatives would migrate
there).
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result of the regulatory arbitrage that predictably would follow.23 Given this asymmetry
(i.e., some nations can profit from lax regulation without necessarily having to face high
costs from a financial contagion), resistance can be anticipated to heighten global
standards to guard against systemic risk. Because any nation—developed or
undeveloped—can potentially offer its jurisdiction as a forum for unregulated (or laxly
regulated) trading, we can expect that underregulated markets will persist.
A key assertion of this Article is that, under these circumstances, all the
preconditions necessary for a “tragedy of the commons” are present.24 In particular,
because (1) other nations cannot be excluded from offering “financial casinos” to those
desiring to trade on them, and (2) many nations do not have to internalize the costs they
impose on others, some nations will behave as “free riders,” preferring that others bear
23

For the similar view of Professor Brummer, see supra note 5, at 267.

24

The “tragedy of the commons” is a standard law and economics problem which arises

when (i) it is impossible to exclude actors from using a resource or engaging in an
activity (“non-excludability”), and (ii) some actors do not have to internalize the costs
they impose on others. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243, 1244–45 (1968). Normally, the result of such a “tragedy” is overuse of a common
resource (such as overgrazed fields or depleted fisheries or polluted air). Here, an
inability to exclude U.S.-based entities from trading in foreign markets produces a related
result: risky activities increase until a financial disaster strikes. “Substituted
compliance” can in this light be viewed as a means of excluding U.S.-based entities from
a dangerous activity that is made possible because other nations do not internalize its
foreseeable costs.
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the costs and encouraging regulatory arbitrage when it benefits them. All this is
predictable from the “tragedy of the commons” perspective, which has long been the
basic paradigm by which environmental law scholars explained the depletion of natural
resources.25 More recently, legal scholars have extended this perspective to explain
problems with public infrastructure (such as communication, transportation, and
healthcare systems).26 A few pioneers have even noted its applicability to financial
markets.27 Still, because the critical economic precondition to a “tragedy of the
commons” is “non-excludability,” this perspective applies with the greatest force to
financial markets when we move to the international context. That is, the participants
25

See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF

INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 144–57, 173–79 (1990) (examining fisheries and
other natural resources).
26

See Carol M. Rose, Big Roads, Big Rights: Varieties of Public Infrastructure and

Their Impact on Environmental Resources, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 409, 413 (2008) (applying
this perspective to transportation infrastructure); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A.
Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 272–73, 281–82, 293–98 (2007) (applying
this perspective to IP (or “innovation”) and communications infrastructure, respectively).
27

See Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime

Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 386 (2008); Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall
Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 147
(2011) (arguing throughout that “‘commons’ literature offers guidance for developing a
governance model that better reflects normative expectations regarding the rights and
responsibilities [in the] financial market system.”).
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who trade on any single market (say, the New York Stock Exchange) can exclude those
market participants who do not play by their rules. Governance structures (administrative
agencies, such as the SEC, or liability rules) can also be devised by any single country to
prevent a “tragedy of the commons” so long as we are focusing only on domestic
activities and transactions. But once traders and other market participants can flee to a
foreign jurisdiction, then (and only then) the precondition of non-excludability is
satisfied.
Once we accept the relevance of the “tragedy of the commons” perspective, a
major implication is that, unless binding law can be generated, the major financial nations
that most bear the costs of systemic risk will be frustrated and disarmed, because they
cannot bar trading outside their borders. Conversely, if these nations can agree bilaterally
on common standards, they can then effectively deal with the “free riders” by simply
denying their own financial institutions the ability to trade in markets that do not comply
with their standards. Bluntly put, the U.S. and the E.U. together have the market power
to achieve this result.
One need not accept every step in this reasoning to reach the same bottom line.
Assume instead that, without trying to lead a race to the bottom in regulation, some
nations may simply tolerate loosely regulated markets to function within their
jurisdiction,24a either out of indifference or because they assume that the major nations
would bail everyone out in the event of a financial contagion (as more or less happened in
2008). These less regulated jurisdictions are essentially free riders, who are expecting
(perhaps shrewdly) other nations to bear the costs (including the costs of massive

24a

See Brummer, supra note 5, at 267.
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bailouts) of preserving economic stability from systemic risk. These free riders may be
aided and abetted in their resistance (or at least indifference) to the need for stronger
regulation by precisely those large financial institutions that most want to escape stronger
regulation. In a globalized world, market participants are extremely mobile and can
escape confining regulation so long as they can delay the major financial nations from
acting. Rhetorically, those opposed to financial reform can unite around a favorite
defensive rallying cry, which is that international regulation must not precede consensus.
As with other public goods problems, public policy needs to find a way to tax the
free riders, which here include those nations willing to tolerate unregulated financial
markets. This Article will consider means to this end, but will basically suggest that the
major financial nations have to bar their own financial institutions (and their offshore
affiliates) from trading in those foreign markets that lack adequate regulation in order to
protect themselves from a systemic risk crisis. That prescription is at odds with the
sovereignty-respecting or consensus-demanding perspectives of many international law
scholars.24b Translated back into the language of international law, this prescription
insists both that non-compulsory soft law is not sufficient and that the broad, aspirational
general principles that international networks can develop will only allow mobile market
participants to continue business as usual. Instead, harder bargaining in minilateral
negotiations is needed, and only the nations that bear the ultimate costs have the
incentives to get the rules right.
24b

See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 17, at 3 (noting that one side of the debate “asserts that

. . . the state is not declining in power or importance” and government actors are
“increasingly networking with their counterparts abroad”).
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Realism counsels, however, that the U.S. cannot unilaterally impose its policy
preferences on the rest of the world. It needs therefore to be selective. When is it most
necessary for it to assert itself on an extraterritorial basis? This Essay focuses on the
“public goods” perspective because it can supply an answer. That is, it can provide a
rationale for a more aggressive approach to extraterritorial financial regulation that
applies to some cases, but not all. Line-drawing is necessary, but it should be based on
principles, and this perspective generates principled distinctions.
This Article will focus on two very different examples of international financial
regulation, which each seek to curb systemic risk, but otherwise contrast sharply. It will
begin by surveying the recent controversy over the efforts of the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to
regulate cross-border swaps trading on an extraterritorial basis. Then, it will turn to the
even more controversial Volcker Rule, which bars major financial institutions (both
domestic institutions and foreign ones that have a branch in the U.S.) from engaging in
proprietary trading or owning or sponsoring a hedge fund.28 These two examples were
28

The final regulations implementing the Volcker Rule were jointly issued by the Federal

Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission on December 10, 2013. They will become effective on April 1, 2014, but
are subject to a “conformance period” that ends on July 21, 2015. See SEC Release No.
BHCA-1; File No. S7-41-11, RIN 3235-AL07 (December 10, 2013) (“Prohibitions and
Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with,
Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds”).
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chosen because they differ in significant ways. The SEC’s and CFTC’s efforts at
regulating swaps and other over-the-counter derivatives grew out of a G-20 summit
where international consensus was achieved as to the need for such regulation.25a In
contrast, the Volcker Rule is a uniquely American innovation without any parallel rule in
other major financial nations. Whether for this or other reasons, the two rules have very
different extraterritorial reaches —and are likely to produce very different costs and
benefits.
I. The Cross-Border Swaps Dilemma
A. The OTC Derivatives Market. If the 2008 financial crisis carried any message
about the necessary shape of financial reform, it was that the over-the-counter (“OTC”)
derivatives market posed special risks to global financial stability. First, the outstanding
notional amount of these OTC derivatives contracts, exceeding $700 trillion as of 2011,
dwarfed even the bond market.29 Second, while all securities and derivatives carry
market risk, OTC derivatives are uniquely also subject to counterparty risk: namely, the
danger that a pivotal counterparty may be unable to make good on its promised

25a

See Greene & Potiha, Examining the Extraterritorial Reach of Dodd–Frank’s Volcker

Rule, supra note 13, at 271–72 & n.2.
29

For this estimate, see Jan D. Luettringhaus, Regulating Over-the-Counter Derivatives

in the European Union—Transatlantic (Dis)Harmony After EMIR and Dodd-Frank: The
Impact on (Re)Insurance Companies and Occupational Pension Funds, 18 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. ONLINE 19, 20 (2012). This figure reduces, however, to $20 trillion if all such
contracts were settled and closed out simultaneously. Id.
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performance (which was, of course, the AIG experience).26a Third, because of the
bilateral nature of these privately negotiated contracts, they are inherently opaque as to
pricing, volume, and the identity of the parties involved; thus, they carry a greater risk of
unforeseen financial contagion.26b Finally, unlike exchange-traded derivatives, which are
highly standardized and subject to initial and variation margin requirements, the
collateralization of OTC derivatives is determined by individual negotiation.26c In a
competitive market, swap dealers may compete (wisely or unwisely) by reducing the
margin that they require from their counterparties. Particularly during a bubble, too little
margin may be required to generate an adequate safety net in later times of market stress.
All this was clear to the U.S. Congress, which by 2010 (the date of the DoddFrank Act) knew three things very well: (1) AIG’s failure had been precipitated by
margin calls from its counterparties that could not be satisfied26d; (2) AIG’s collapse had
necessitated a $182 billion bail-out borne by the American taxpayer26e; and (3) AIG’s
credit default swaps had been written by a foreign subsidiary (based in the U.K.) that was
effectively unregulated.26f From the outset, this AIG experience inclined the U.S.
Congress towards an extraterritorial approach; Congress did not want to be burnt twice

26a

See id. at 20–21.

26b

See id. at 20, 25.

26c

See id. at 20.

26d

See Sjostrom, supra note 7, at 961–62.

26e

See Greenberger, supra note 5, at 976.

26f

See id. at 976–77.
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by foreign affiliates of U.S. financial institutions entering into imprudent and unregulated
OTC transactions.
The G-20 leaders recognized the need to address OTC derivatives as a special
priority at their 2009 summit in Pittsburgh, where they agreed to impose clearing,
reporting, and risk mitigation requirements on OTC derivative transactions .30 The use of
clearinghouses implied standardized margin levels for exchange-traded derivatives (and
thus the effective elimination of counterparty risk), but specially tailored OTC derivatives
are too individualized to be capable of trading on exchanges or clearing through
clearinghouses. In these cases, risk mitigation rules (including margin levels) would have
to be specified.
This was not a minor problem for at least two reasons: First, banks and other
major swap dealers profited handsomely from trading derivatives on an over-the-counter
basis because such trading is opaque and hence less subject to competitive pressure.27a
Swap dealers have incentives to resist efforts to impose transparency by converting
30

The G-20 nations convened their Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009 to address the

2008 financial crisis. Their Pittsburgh Summit Preamble called for “enhanced and
expanded . . . scope of regulation and oversight, with tougher regulation of over-thecounter (OTC) derivatives, securitization markets, credit rating agencies, and hedge
funds.” See Greene & Potiha, Examining the Extraterritorial Reach of Dodd–Frank’s
Volcker Rule, supra note 13, at 272 n.2.
27a

See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 45–

51 (2011) (detailing the relationship between the rising profitability of the OTC
derivatives market and its lack of transparency). [ER 6]
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specialized contracts into more standardized contracts that could trade openly on
exchanges. Put simply, transparency implies increased competition, which would in turn
erode away the economic rents that swap dealers earned on privately negotiated
transactions. Second, the OTC derivatives market, centered in London, is highly
international in character. By some estimates, 55 to 75% of the total derivatives exposure
of U.S. banks was to foreign entities.31 Indeed, in the extreme case of credit default
swaps, only approximately 7% of U.S. single-name CDS transactions in 2011 were
between two U.S.-domiciled counterparties, with the rest involving a foreign
counterparty.32 Thus, as the SEC has recently noted, “cross-border transactions are the
norm, not the exception.”33
Next, regulatory reform had to address the problem of geographic uncertainty.
Because OTC derivatives are not traded on exchanges, they do not have any clear-cut
geographic location. Swap transactions can be between participants in two different
countries, booked in a third country, and risk-managed in a fourth country. Hence, swap
transactions did not need to be based in the U.S. and could easily be moved offshore—if
such a migration allowed the swaps dealer to escape regulation. Thus, the incentive to
31

See Luettringhaus, supra note 26, at 26 & n.57.

32

See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-69490 (“Cross-Border Security-Based

Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating
to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap
Participants”) 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968, 30,976 (May 23, 2013) [hereinafter “SEC CrossBorder Swaps Proposal”].
33

Id.
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engage in regulatory arbitrage was uniquely high, and an angry Congress decided in the
Dodd-Frank Act to respond by deeming U.S. law to apply if a U.S. entity was
involved.30a
B. The Congressional Response. Given this background, Title VII of the DoddFrank Act, which focuses on the derivatives markets, adopted several provisions aimed at
foreign entities that have seldom, if ever, been seen before in U.S. financial regulation.
For example, Section 715 (“Authority to Prohibit Participation in Swap Activities”)
provides that, with certain exceptions:
“[I]f the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or the
Securities and Exchange Commission determines that the
regulation of swaps or security-based swaps markets in a
foreign country undermines the stability of the United
States financial system, either Commission, in consultation
with the Secretary of the Treasury, may prohibit an entity
domiciled in the foreign county from participating in the
United States in any swap or security-based swap
activities.”34

Effectively, this was a shot across the bow for other nations, and its message was blunt:
Mess with the U.S. and your financial institutions (and others) will be barred from our
swap markets!

30a

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 722(d), 7 U.S.C. §

2(i) (2012).
34

15 U.S.C. § 8304. (2012). Section 715 does contain an exception if certain findings are

made under Section 4 of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. § 6). Id.
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Similarly, Section 722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act broadly amended the
Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) to provide that the new Dodd-Frank Act provisions
did not apply extraterritorially “unless those activities—
(1) have a direct and significant connection with activities
in, or effect on, commerce of the United States; or
(2) contravene such rules or regulations as the Commission
may prescribe or promulgate as are necessary or
appropriate to prevent the evasion of any provision of this
Act that was enacted by the Wall Street Transparency and
Accountability Act of 2010.”35

This statutory language represents an extreme case of the exception swallowing the rule:
the Dodd-Frank Act does not apply extraterritorially, except to activities that are
“significant” or “evasive.” Add to this the extremely broad definitions of “swap dealer”
and “major swap participant,” which ignore the domicile of the entity and focus instead
on the size of the positions it holds, the potential exposure created, and its degree of
leverage,32a and it was clear at the outset that Title VII would sweep very broadly beyond
the U.S. Yet, although it has received much less attention, the E.U.’s recent and key
trading regulation, the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (“EMIR”), has an
equally broad sweep and uses virtually the same tests.36

35

Pub. L. 111-203 (July 21, 2010), 124 Stat. 1673. Section 722(d) (“Applicability”) of

the Dodd-Frank Act is now set forth as Section 2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (7
U.S.C. § 2(i)). Id.
32a

36

See § 721(a)(21), 7 U.S.C. § 1a(49); § 721(a)(16), 7 U.S.C. § 1a(33).

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
-30-

Structurally, Title VII of Dodd-Frank sought to reduce systemic risk through a
variety of strategies. First, Title VII repealed parts of the Commodities Futures
Modernization Act of 2000, which had deregulated the OTC derivatives market.33a [ER
7] Title VII then divided the field so as to give the CFTC jurisdiction over swaps and the
SEC jurisdiction over the much smaller world of “security-based swaps.”37
Organizationally, Title VII mandated two types of rules: (1) entity-level rules (which, for
example, require registration of “swap dealers” and “major swap participants”), and (2)
transaction-based rules, which regulate individual swap transactions (including through
rules regulating capital, margin, risk management, clearing and trading).38 Our focus will
be on these latter rules that attempt to prevent another AIG-style debacle by specifying
mandatory risk mitigation strategies for OTC derivatives market. In that light, two
provisions stand out. First, Section 2(h)(1) of the CEA now requires a swap to be
submitted to a clearinghouse for clearing, unless one of the parties was eligible for an

33a

See, e.g., § 725(g)(1)(A) (repealing the Commodities and Futures Modernization Act

of 2000 § 407, 7 U.S.C. § 27(e)).
37

Compare § 712(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 8302(a)(1), (b)(1) (authorizing the CFTC to regulate

swaps and precluding CFTC jurisdiction over security-based swaps, respectively) with
§ 712(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 8302(a)(2), (b)(2) (authorizing the SEC to regulate securitybased swaps and precluding SEC jurisdiction over swaps, respectively). The SEC and
CFTC jointly regulate a third hybrid category known as “mixed swaps.” See § 712(a)(8),
15 U.S.C. § 8302(a)(8).
38

See § 7312010) (adding § 4s to the CEA).
-31-

exemption and elected not to clear the swap.35a Although this was intended to minimize
counterparty risk, its impact is probably marginal, because many participants and many
instruments in the OTC derivatives market are exempt for a variety of reasons.39
Second, Section 4s(e) of the CEA mandated margin requirements (both initial and
variation margin) for swap dealers and major swap participants that trade in uncleared
swaps.40 This provision generally ensures (with notable exceptions) that current and
potential risk exposures between swap dealers and their counterparties are collateralized,
thereby reducing the danger that swap dealers or major swap participants could take on

35a
39

7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(1).
First, Section 723 of the Dodd-Frank Act exempts commercial end-users from

mandatory clearing requirements. Second, to the extent that the swap can be custom
designed, it will not be tradeable on an exchange, which can trade only relatively
standardized products. This creates a strong incentive for swap dealers to avoid
standardization.
40

7 U.S.C. § 4s(e). The margin rules under the Dodd-Frank Act are complex and vary by

the nature of the counterparty. Basically, for trades between swap entities, the rules
require the posting and collection of initial and variation margin. Where the counterparty
is not a swap dealer or major swap participant, but is a financial institution, the swap
dealer or major swap participant must collect, but not pay, initial and variation margin.
Swap entities are not required, however, to collect or pay margin to non-financial entities
(including commercial end users). For a brief review of these rules, see Greene & Potiha,
Examining the Extraterritorial Reach of Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule, supra note 13, at
277–80.
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excessive risk or be unable to fulfill their obligations. In addition, Section 4s(l) of the
CEA gave the counterparty to the swap dealer or major swap participant the right to
request that such margin to be segregated with a third party custodian. The practical
impact of these new margin rules was to require swap dealers to collect initial and
variation margin from many counterparties that had not previously posted it, thus raising
the cost of engaging in the OTC derivatives market.
Collectively, these and other new provisions were certain to be costly to swap
dealers and others who could not escape them.41 The U.S. financial services industry
quickly recognized that its best hope for relief was to convince financial regulators to
adopt a broad theory of “substituted compliance”38a—namely, that a U.S. swaps dealer
complied with Dodd-Frank’s requirements if the transaction was based abroad and
complied with host country requirements that were “substantially equivalent.” If
“substituted compliance” was sufficient, then U.S. swaps dealers could largely escape the
danger that Dodd-Frank would place them at a regulatory disadvantage to their foreign
competitors and possibly cost them business.

41

The International Securities Dealers Association, a trade group, has estimated that an

additional $1 trillion in collateral may have to be posted as a result of proposed DoddFrank reforms. See Greene & Potiha, Examining the Extraterritorial Reach of DoddFrank’s Volcker Rule, supra note 13, at 280.
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Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1302–07 (2013) (describing the efforts of the
financial industry to convince regulators to relax cross-border swaps rules). [ER 8]
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C. The CFTC’s Position. In June 2012, almost two years after the enactment of
Dodd-Frank, the CFTC finally addressed the key issue of extraterritorial application by
proposing “guidance” on when the provisions of Title VII applicable to swap dealers and
major swap participants would apply to non-U.S. persons.42 Simply put, the CFTC’s
proposed guidance fell far short of what the U.S. financial services industry wanted, and
their predictable disappointment probably explains why the CFTC chose at the outset to
call its determinations “guidance,” rather than “rules.”43 Under its proposed “cross-

42

See “Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity

Exchange Act,” 77 Fed. Reg. 41,214 (July 12, 2012). [hereinafter “Cross-Border
Application.”]
43

Although no CFTC document or Commissioner has ever conceded this, the CFTC’s

insistence on calling this release “guidance” and a “policy statement,” rather than issuing
it as a formal rule, may have been an effort to avoid judicial review by the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, which has been increasingly ready to reject regulatory rules by
financial regulators that were not preceded by—in its view—an adequate cost/benefit
analysis. See Business Roundtable Inc. v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(“We agree with the petitioners and hold the Commission acted arbitrarily and
capriciously for having failed once again . . . adequately to assess the economic effects of
a new rule.”). Nonetheless, this exercise in prudential semantics has not spared the
CFTC from litigation challenging these rules on the same cost/benefit arguments in the
D.C. Circuit. In December, 2013, such a suit was brought by the major banking industry
trade groups. See Landon Thomas Jr., Wall Street Challenges Overseas Swaps Rules,
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border guidance,” non-U.S. persons with significant swap positions were required to
register with the CFTC as swap entities40a (but would have been subject to only a limited
set of requirements based on this registration). More substantive and demanding than
these registration requirements were the proposed “transaction-level” requirements; these
would apply to transactions between (a) non-U.S. persons and U.S. persons, (b) foreign
affiliates of a U.S. person and either U.S. or non-U.S. persons, and (c) U.S. branches of a
non-U.S. swap dealer and U.S. or non-U.S. persons.40b These substantive requirements
would include clearing, margin, real-time public reporting, trade execution and sales
practices.40c To illustrate, both (1) the London branch of Morgan Stanley transacting in
London with a Hong Kong-based customer, and (2) a Barclays’ subsidiary entering into a
transaction with a U.S. customer anywhere in the world would have been covered. In
addition, if Barclays operated in the U.S., all its branches worldwide would be covered by
the Dodd-Frank Act’s rules. The regulatory burden clearly would have been substantial,
and the guidance would have only exempted transactions between a non-U.S. swap entity
and a non-U.S. counterparty that was not an affiliate of a U.S. person.
Effectively, this guidance sheltered from Dodd-Frank’s application only non-U.S.
registered swap dealers or non-U.S. major swap participants, who could comply with
comparable foreign regulatory requirements, as an alternative to complying with DoddFrank’s mandated transaction requirements, in dealing with non-U.S. persons. This

N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2013 at B-5. This issue of cost/benefit analysis is beyond the scope
of this Essay.
40a

See “Cross-Border Application,” supra note 39, at 41,219.
See id. at 41,228–29.
40c
See id. at 41,225.
40b
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exemption for non-U.S. swap dealers may have exacerbated the problem for U.S. dealers,
who now foresaw being placed at a competitive disadvantage at their foreign branches
and subsidiaries.
Even this proposed relief for non-U.S. swap dealers was not necessarily available,
but would require that the CFTC recognize the alternative host country’s requirements
satisfied its tests for “substituted compliance.” Here, the CFTC seemed intent on a
substantive review of the foreign regulations before deeming them comparable,40d and
again this heightened the industry’s level of apprehension.
The CFTC’s proposed guidance touched off intensive negotiations and lobbying.
In Congress, the sides were quickly drawn. Republicans favored a broad definition of
“substituted compliance,” and legislation was introduced in the Republican-dominated
House to mandate that all G-20 nations automatically qualified for “substituted
compliance.”40e Because Congressmen seldom feel pressure from foreigners (who cannot
vote), this legislation seems clearly the product of lobbying by the financial services
industry. Conversely, in the Democrat-dominated Senate, eight liberal Democratic
Senators wrote to the CFTC and the SEC chairs to demand that loopholes be closed in
their swaps rules and that they not “outsource” their regulations to foreign countries (i.e.,
that they should not recognize “substituted compliance”).44
40d

See id. at 41,229–34 (setting forth the CFTC’s proposed “substituted compliance”

regime).
40e
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See H.R. Rep. No. 113-103, at 2–3 (2013). [ER 9]
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Senators Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Carl Levin (D-MI), Tom Harkin (D-IA), Elizabeth
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More pressure, however, was applied from the opposite direction. In April, 2013,
the E.U. and the finance ministers from most of the major financial nations jointly sent a
strongly-worded letter to the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and the CFTC, warning of a
“fragmentation” of the derivatives market if proper deference was not accorded to
European rules (and, in particular, EMIR).45 Perhaps even more importantly, the SEC
proposed its own corresponding rules for “security-based swaps,” and the SEC—perhaps
characteristically—took a more restrained position, closer to that of the financial services
industry, thereby undercutting the CFTC by proposing a more expansive and deferential
definition of “substituted compliance.”46 Finally, a key Democratic Commissioner on the
Warren (D-MA), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Barbara Boxer (D-CA), Richard Blumenthal
(D-CT) and Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), urging both agencies to close perceived major
loopholes in their swap rules and not defer to foreign regulators. (Copy on file with
Cornell Law Review).
45

Nine senior financial regulators sent an April 18, 2013 letter to Treasury Secretary Lew

expressing concern about “fragmentation” in the OTC market if the U.S. insisted on
applying its own rules extraterritorially. These included the relevant ministers from
Japan, Russia, South Africa, Brazil, Switzerland, France, Germany, as well as Michel
Barnier, the E.U.’s Commissioner for Internal Markets and Services. See “Interpretive
Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,”
78 Fed. Reg. 45,292, 45,392 & n.455 (July 26, 2013) (discussing the negotiations)
[hereinafter “Interpretive Guidance”].
46

See SEC Cross-Border Swaps Proposal, supra note 29, at 31,085 (“[T]he Commission

is proposing a ‘comparability’ standard as the basis for making a substituted compliance
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CFTC began to waiver in his support for the CFTC’s harder line position.47 With his
support crumbling, CFTC Chairman Gensler began to negotiate a compromise in order to
hold onto a majority.
In July 2013, in response to pressure from all sides, the CFTC modified its
proposed guidance.48 It retreated significantly, but not completely. First, to show that it
was not abandoning its core position, it expanded its definition of “U.S. person” to
include both foreign branches of a U.S. person and offshore hedge funds that had a

determination . . . [that would] ultimately focus on regulatory outcomes as a whole with
respect to the requirements within the same category rather than a rule-by-rule
comparison.”). See also Andrew Ackerman, SEC Poised to Give Overseas Firms Leeway
on Swaps, WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE (Apr. 30, 2013, 5:53 p.m. ET),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323798104578455263840421672
.
47

The Democratic Commissioner was Mark Wetjen, who was widely perceived as the

swing vote on the CFTC. See Shahien Nasiripour, Michael Mackenzie, & Tom
Braithwaite, U.S. Watchdog Set to Weaken Derivatives Rules, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 28,
2013, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e3fd4f66-81d0-11e2-b05000144feabdc0.html#axzz2uGPlXRHw; see also Jamila Trindle, CFTC Delays Swap Vote
as Member Voices Concerns, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb.12, 2013, 8:51 p.m. ET),
available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324880504578300772419844396
.
48

See Interpretive Guidance, supra note 42, at 45,292..
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majority U.S. ownership (direct or indirect) or a principal place of business in the U.S.49
Then, in a significant retreat, it conceded that foreign branches of U.S. banks could
generally satisfy Dodd-Frank’s requirements through “substituted compliance” (i.e.,
compliance with the comparable requirements of another jurisdiction) if the transaction
had a “bona fide” connection to the non-U.S. branch.50 But if the foreign branch of a
U.S. bank entered into a swap with a U.S. person (other than another foreign branch of a
U.S. bank), then U.S. transactional rules would apply (and the foreign branch could not
rely on substituted compliance).51 The CFTC further indicated that, in determining
whether a particular category of requirements of another country were to be deemed
comparable to Dodd-Frank’s requirements, it would use an “outcomes-based
approach.”52 But it did not adopt the “holistic” approach that many had urged on it and
seemed prepared to closely examine the actual substantive rules of the particular
jurisdiction.
Correspondingly, non-U.S. swap dealers would be required to comply with the
CFTC’s transactions-level requirements in dealing with U.S. persons and certain affiliates

49

See id. at 45,301–02.

50

See id. at 45,327–28 (viewing the foreign branch of a U.S. person as also a U.S.

person). But having said that a foreign branch was a U.S. person, the Interpretive
Guidance then permitted these foreign branches in most cases to substitute compliance
with the rules of the location of the foreign branch. See id. at 45,342.
51

See id. at 45,348.

52

See id. at 45,342–43.
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of U.S. persons.53 Thus, Goldman Sachs’s London branch would have to observe DoddFrank’s transactional requirements in dealing with U.S. persons, but could compete by
the same rules as its European rivals in dealing with non-U.S. persons and certain U.S.
affiliates. Similarly, a British bank would have to comply with the Dodd-Frank Act’s
requirements in dealing with most U.S. persons, but not with non-U.S. persons (and
certain affiliates of U.S. persons). Substituted compliance would not apply in these
contexts where the counterparty was a U.S. person. This position leveled the playing
field (so that U.S. swap dealers were at less of a competitive disadvantage), but did not
necessarily alleviate the problem of systemic risk.
Equally important, the staff of the CFTC contemporaneously issued a no-action
letter in which it indicated that certain risk management requirements of the European
Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) were substantially identical to the CFTC’s own
rules.54 This seemed to imply that the European rules on the key “transaction-level”
53

See id. at 45,350.

54

See 2013 CFTC Ltr. LEXIS 47 (July 11, 2013) (“Re: No-Action Relief for Registered

Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants from Certain Requirements under Subpart I
of Part 23 of Commission Regulations in Connection with Uncleared Swaps Subject to
Risk Mitigation Techniques under EMIR”) at 1 [hereinafter “No-Action Letter”]. The
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (“EMIR”) was adopted on August 16, 2012
by the European Commission (“EC”) on behalf of the European Union (“EU”). It
authorized the European Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”) to develop
technical standards, which were in turn adopted by the EC on March 15, 2013. One
subpart of these standards were the EMIR Risk Mitigation Rules, which basically apply
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issues relating to over-the-counter derivatives appeared to satisfy the “substituted
compliance” standard. That was critical because, as the no-action letter noted, of the 80
swap dealers currently registered with the CFTC, 35 were organized outside the United
States, of which 22 were established within the E.U.55
In an understandable effort to gain needed time, the CFTC issued an exemptive
order on July 22, 2013 that effectively allowed it to delay comparability determinations
until late 2013.56 Then, on December 20, 2013, one day before the scheduled expiration
to over-the-counter (or “uncleared”) derivatives, including swaps. The no-action letter
found that the CFTC’s Risk Mitigation Rules (Regulation §§ 23.501, 23.502, 23.503 and
portions of 23.504, as promulgated under Section 4s(i) of the CEA, were “essentially
identical” with the EMIR Risk Mitigation Rules after a section by section comparison.
Id. at 2.
Controversy surrounded the issuance of this advice in the form of a No-Action
Letter from a single CFTC division, rather than in the form of formal CFTC regulations.
In this author’s judgment, the use of an informal no-action letter may have been preferred
because it likely immunized this position from judicial review by the D.C. Circuit under
the Administrative Procedure Act. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144
(D.C. Cir. 2011). Nonetheless, litigation has been brought on this ground. See supra
note 40.
55

See No-Action Letter at n.1.

56

See “Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” RIN

3038-AE05, 78 Fed. Reg. 43,785, 43,792 (July 22, 2013). The exemptive relief granted
by this order expired no later than December 21, 2013. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 43,794.
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of this exemptive order, the CFTC announced a series of comparability determinations
covering the E.U., Australia, Canada, Japan, Hong Kong and Switzerland.57 Basically,
the CFTC made favorable comparability determinations for all six with respect to “entitylevel” requirements, but largely reserved judgment on “transaction-level” requirements,
approving only a limited number of such requirements for the E.U. and Japan.58 The
57

These comparability determinations for the six different countries (including the E.U.)

are set forth at 78 Fed. Reg. 78,864 (Australia), 78 Fed. Reg. 78,852 (Hong Kong), 78
Fed. Reg. 78,910 (Japan), 78 Fed. Reg. 78,899 (Switzerland), 78 Fed. Reg. 78,839
(Canada), and 78 Fed. Reg. 78,923 (European Union). All were published in the Federal
Register on December 27, 2013. In addition, “transaction-level” determinations were
made for the European Union and Japan. See 78 Fed. Reg. 78,878 (European Union)
(Dec. 27, 2013) and 78 Fed. Reg. 78,890 (Japan) (Dec. 27, 2013). These determinations
are succinctly summarized in Davis Polk, Client Memorandum, CFTC Issues CrossBorder Substituted Compliance Determinations, Provides Limited Phase In For Some
Swap Requirements (Jan. 7, 2014), available at
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/01.07.14.CFTC_.Issues.CrossBorder.Substit
uted.pdf [hereinafter “Davis Polk Client Memo”].
58

The CFTC made its comparability determinations for each of the six above listed

countries with respect to the following “entity-level” requirements: (1) position limit
monitoring; (2) diligent supervision; (3) business continuity and disaster recovery; (4)
research and clearing conflicts; and (5) availability of information for disclosure and
swap data recording keeping (subject to some exceptions). The CFTC did not, however,
make comparability determinations for any jurisdiction with respect to its requirement
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CFTC also issued two no-action letters delaying the application of swap data reporting
rules for certain non-U.S. swap dealers.59 Nonetheless, despite these steps, the Wall
that swap dealers provide it with compliance and risk reports. See “Davis Polk Client
Memo,” supra note 54, at 2. Thus, while swap dealers can rely on substituted
compliance for most entity-level requirements in these six jurisdictions, they will still
need to submit some reports and records to the CFTC.
With respect to “transaction-level” requirements, the CFTC found the E.U.’s trade
confirmation, portfolio reconciliation, and portfolio compression requirements fully
comparable to those in the U.S. See 78 Fed. Reg. 78,886 (trade confirmation), 78,884
(portfolio reconciliation), 78,885 (portfolio compression). Only pre-trade execution
information in the E.U. was found less than comparable. See 78 Fed. Reg. 78,888. In the
case of Japan, the CFTC found Japanese daily trading records comparable, but made no
finding with respect to trade confirmation, portfolio reconciliation, and portfolio
compression standards. 78 Fed. Reg. 78,897.
More significantly, the CFTC did not make comparability determinations for any
jurisdiction for transaction-level requirements with respect to clearing and trade
execution.
59

See CFTC Letter No. 13-75 (Dec. 20, 2013) (“Time-Limited No-Action Relief from

Certain Requirements of Part 45 and Part 46 of the Commission’s Regulations, for
Certain Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants Established under the Laws of
Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan or Switzerland”) and CFTC Letter No. 1378 (Dec. 20, 2013) (“Time-Limited No-Action Relief from Certain Entity-Level Internal
Business Conduct Requirements for Certain Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants
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Street Journal reported that the CFTC’s actions were “likely to renew criticism the U.S. is
bidding to become the de facto global financial regulator” because the CFTC “only
narrowly recognized overseas regulations, permitting overseas firms to fall under their
home-country rules” by limiting its approval of transaction-level requirements.60

By the end of 2013, the CFTC was only midway through its process. It had
indicated that, except in certain transactions with U.S. persons, non-U.S. swap dealers
will generally be able to rely on substituted compliance, but it had not yet decided
whether most “transaction level” requirements (and some “entity-level” requirements) are
adequately “equivalent” to satisfy its “substituted compliance” standards at even the most
financially developed and comparable nations.57a
Then, everything changed, with the departure in early 2014 of the CFTC’s
chairman, Gary Gensler, whose activist style was uncharacteristic for the CFTC.57b

Established under the Laws of Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, and
Switzerland”).
60

See Andrew Ackerman, “CFTC Extends Some Swaps Rules to Overseas Firms,” WALL

STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 21, 2013, 2:24 p.m. ET), available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304866904579272510388548966
.
57a

See discussion supra.

57b

See Ben Protess, Regulator of Wall Street Loses Its Hard-Charging Chairman, N.Y.

TIMES (Jan. 2, 2014), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/02/regulator-ofwall-street-loses-its-hard-charging-chairman/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. [ER 10]
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Gensler’s successor, Acting Chairman Mark P. Wetjen, moved quickly to modify
Gensler’s position and accept substituted compliance on a more thorough-going and
deferential basis.61 According to the Wall Street Journal, the timing of the CFTC’s
relaxation of its OTC derivatives rules in February, 2014 was motivated by the February
15, 2014 deadline on which U.S. trading restrictions were to go into effect, even though
Europe had “yet to set a date for the implementation of its swaps-trading rules, which . . .
some fear aren’t as strict as the U.S. restrictions.”62 Thus, by allowing swaps dealers to
escape the new U.S. rules, this relaxation implied that swaps dealers would remain
largely unregulated in Europe for an interim period. Given these differences in timing and
strictness, observers, according to the Wall Street Journal, concluded that the impact of
the CFTC’s decision “will encourage banks to move more swaps trading overseas to
escape strict U.S. regulations intended to bring some transparency to the financial
products.”63
This conclusion seems inescapable: for the United States, substituted compliance
will mean a loss of market share, revenues, and jobs as trading moves overseas to
marginally less regulated markets. To be sure, the magnitude of this loss cannot now be
estimated, but it is a rare policy shift that both (1) exposes the U.S. to greater risk, and (2)
costs it jobs and market share at the same time. The logic of such a policy shift needs
closer scrutiny.

Whether the CFTC will entirely abandon the Gensler insistence on

See Andrew Ackerman and Katy Burne, “CFTC Is Set to Ease Rules on Trading Swaps
Overseas,” The Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2014 at C-5; for a similar conclusion, see
Phillip Stafford and Gina Chan, “Watchdogs reach deal on OTC derivatives rules,” Financial
Times, February 13, 2014 at 18. For Mr. Wetjen’s position, see Testimony of Mark P. Wetjen,
Acting Chairman, Commodities Futures Trading Commission, before the Senate Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, February 6, 2014.
62
See Ackerman and Burne, supra note 61, at C-5.
63
Id.
61
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some extraterritorial application of U.S. swaps rules remains uncertain, but its rules for
the time being still appear more aggressive than those of its sibling regulator, the SEC.
First, the CFTC’s definition of “U.S. person” captures offshore hedge funds that are
majority owned by U.S. persons or that have their principal place of business in the
U.S.57c Second, the CFTC may continue to insist that, swaps dealers, foreign or
domestic, transacting with U.S. persons (other than a foreign branch of a U.S. bank),
must comply with the CFTC’s rules, and not those of any other country.57d Substituted
compliance thus operates only within a lesser range for the CFTC.
D. The SEC’s Position. Uncertain as the final shape of the CFTC’s margin rules
may be, the CFTC’s overall approach to the topic of substituted compliance clearly seems
more exacting than the SEC’s. In its proposed rules for cross-border swaps trading, the
SEC made no effort to carve out transactions with U.S. persons as beyond the reach of
substituted compliance.58a Still, the SEC did sensibly subdivide its comparability
analysis into four separate categories, indicating that it would make “substituted
compliance determinations with respect to four separate categories of requirements,” with
the result that if a foreign jurisdiction achieved “comparable regulatory outcomes in three
out of the four categories, then the Commission would permit substituted compliance
with respect to those three categories of comparable requirements,” but not for the

57c

See supra note 47 and accompanying text.

57d

See supra note 48 and accompanying text.

58a

See SEC Cross-Border Swaps Proposal, supra note 29, at 30,975.
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fourth.64 This means that the SEC’s approach is less “holistic” than it first appears, as
close (or even identical) comparability in one of these four categories does not spill over
and bias the comparison in another category.
Still, the SEC has recognized that some issues interrelate. Thus, it has indicated
that it “would expect to make a substituted compliance determination for the entire group
of related requirements.”65 It added:
“For example, the core entity-level requirements relate to
the regulation of an entity’s capital and margin. But certain
other entity-level requirements (such as risk management,
general recordkeeping and reporting, and diligent
supervision) are so interconnected with capital and margin
oversight that we would expect to make substituted
compliance determinations, where warranted with regard to
capital and margin rules, on the entire package of entitylevel regulations.”66

Thus, those rules having the greatest significance from a systemic risk standpoint (most
notably, capital adequacy and margin) would typically be reviewed on an interrelated
basis. This probably makes sense, but the SEC also believes that entity-level decisions as
to capital adequacy and margin should not be made by it in the case of a swap entity that

64

Id. The four categories are (1) requirements applicable to registered security-based

swap dealers under Section 15F of the Exchange Act; (2) requirements relating to
regulatory reporting and public dissemination of information on security-based swaps; (3)
requirements relating to clearing for security-based swaps; and (4) requirements relating
to trade execution for security-based swaps. See id. at 31,085.
65

Id. at 31,088.
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Id. at 31,088–89.
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is a bank, but by the appropriate banking regulator.67 Because banks are the largest swap
dealers, this leaves the SEC formally determining substituted compliance, but deferring
to the bank regulators to make the determination as to the most important provisions
(from a systemic risk perspective) in that calculus.
Procedurally, the SEC contemplates that swap dealers would make an application,
possibly as a group, for a substituted compliance determination, but it would require as a
precondition that there be a Memorandum of Understanding in force between the SEC
and the foreign country, covering supervision and enforcement.68
E. The European Reaction and A Proposal. As of early 2014, the SEC and CFTC
disagreed mainly over how much protection should be given to U.S. persons. The CFTC
required all swap dealers generally to play by its rules when the transaction involves a
U.S. person (but not otherwise),63a while the SEC permitted all off-shore transactions to
be governed by the still emerging rules of substituted compliance (without any special
exception for transactions with U.S. persons).63b Both agencies were ready to defer in
most cases to foreign regulators if they judged their rules (at differing levels of
granularity) to be functionally equivalent.63c Yet, at present, no one quite knows what the
applicable European rules are (for example, with regard to margin).

67

Id. at 31,090.
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Id. at 31,088–89.
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See Cross-Border Application, supra note 39, at 41,217–18.
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See SEC Cross-Border Swaps Proposal, supra note 29, at 30,975.
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See id. at 31,009; see also Cross-Border Application, supra note 39, at 41,217.
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Europe remains undecided on many of these questions.69 Starting, as the U.S. did,
from the same G-20 agreement on OTC derivatives at the 2009 summit, Europe has
moved more slowly, and symptomatic fissures have appeared within its regulatory
structure. A “trialogue” on this issue in December 2013 among the European Parliament,
the European Commission, and the Council of the European Union ended in an
“acrimonious” stalemate, with the British and French delegates criticizing each other.70
Such division is not surprising and reflects the fact that the U.S. has a much stronger
federal structure than Europe. Intense as the debate over financial regulation may be in
the U.S., the individual states do not intervene in it (i.e., California does not object to the
SEC or sue the CFTC). But, in Europe, individual nations can and do object and delay
agreement. Predictably, the delay would be even greater if global harmonization were
sought, and industry groups are adept at exploiting this tendency toward fragmentation to
delay reforms that are costly to them.71
Earlier, this Article suggested the need for a minilateral strategy in dealing with
systemic risk in order to address the underlying “public goods” problem. The European
difficulty with OTC rules illustrates this need. Put simply, some nations will resist or
69

See Danny Hakim, “Europeans Struggle to Set Derivatives Rules,” N.Y. TIMES,

January 14, 2014 at B-1.
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Id. at B-2.
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Often the resentment at U.S. “imperialism” seems to be stoked by lobbying firms

representing the industry (and sometimes based in the U.S.). In the case of the current
E.U. deadlock, the Commodity Markets Council (which is based in Washington) appears
to be leading the opposition to the E.U.’s proposed rule. Id. at B-2.
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delay reform because (i) the reforms have adverse distributional consequences to them or
(ii) they do not expect to bear the full costs of a systemic risk crisis. Thus, if Europe has
difficulty in acting, a global resolution seems even more infeasible in the near term (both
because many nations would resist what they would see as excessive U.S. pressure and
because the resulting principles would likely be too vague and general to have much
impact). As a generalization, the more the parties to the negotiation, the greater the
possibility that some group can exercise a minority veto, slowing or blocking the reform
as a practical matter. While soft law proponents believe in harmonization of standards,
they ignore the greater vulnerability of harmonization, as a process played out on a larger
stage, to deliberate obstruction by highly motivated industry groups.66a
Given this difficulty, how then should financial regulators escape this dilemma?
Current proposals seem likely only to exacerbate the problem. In its proposed crossborder swaps rules, the SEC contemplates that swap dealers, or groups of them, would
apply to it for a “substituted compliance determination” that, for example, the regulatory
regime of “Country X” was functionally equivalent to that of the U.S.66b This procedure
will likely result in all the major security-based swap dealers active in Country X filing a
joint submission with the SEC. Arguably, this will confront the SEC with a powerful
lobby, and also provide it with little opportunity to discuss and negotiate with Country X.
Instead, the better route would be for Country X to, itself, file the application with
the SEC in order that there could be joint discussion as to what changes the U.S. regulator
wanted before it would deem Country X’s regulatory regime “functionally equivalent.”
66a

See id.

66b

See SEC Cross-Border Swaps Proposal, supra note 29, at 31,094.
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The result would be a quiet bilateral negotiation. Already, under the SEC’s proposed
rules, some bilateral negotiations between U.S. regulators and those in the host country
are necessary, as the SEC requires that a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
between the U.S. and the host country governing supervision and enforcement have been
signed.66c The key advantage of this approach is that (i) it does not treat the host
country’s laws as static and fixed, and (ii) it does not place the U.S. in the unattractive
position of seemingly telling the world what its laws must say. Instead, a quieter
negotiation would begin over the narrower issue of functional equivalence.
To be sure, bilateral negotiations face problems of diplomacy. Once the U.S. has
found some nations to be functionally equivalent (as it now has at least for “entity-level”
requirements), it is stigmatizing and potentially humiliating for it to tell other nations that
their legal regimes are not equivalent. The implication is that its laws and practices are
somehow backward.
What then is the better strategy? Ideally, the U.S. (possibly in conjunction with
the E.U.) should proactively define what the critical elements are of a “functionally
equivalent” policy toward OTC derivatives. These criteria should focus more on those
factors that truly relate to systemic risk (e.g., capital, leverage, margin, etc.) and less on
rules that relate to consumer protection or business conduct. Announcement of those
rules should precede negotiation. Nations eager to achieve “functional equivalence”
could then score themselves in advance and take steps to comply. Motivating them
would be an implicit threat: failure to reach an agreement with the U.S. would mean that
U.S. swap entities (i.e., dealers and major swap participants) would be unable to trade

66c

See id. at 31,088–89.
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with other swap dealers in their jurisdiction—at least without fully complying with DoddFrank’s requirements. In effect, the trading parties would have to comply with both U.S.
and foreign law, and this might well be impossible. Thus, this approach taxes the free
riders who are unwilling to reach a modus vivendi with the U.S.
Moreover, now that the U.S. and the E.U. have reached partial agreement on their
rules for swaps trading (even if many blanks remain to be filled in), an opportunity for
rapid legal development looms. Together, the U.S. and the E.U. represent a high majority
of global swaps trading66d and possess considerable leverage in encouraging other nations
to play by their rules. If they could jointly agree on common criteria, they would thereby
notify other countries (e.g., Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada, Brazil, etc.) as to the
minimum requirements that they would require to consider another regulatory regime
functionally equivalent. That is, rather than sitting down to multiple negotiations, each
with its unique facts, or convening a global conference aimed at international
harmonization, the U.S. and Europe could proactively declare in advance what the
minimum elements were that they would require before another regulatory regime could
qualify for substituted compliance. That would have impact because many nations are
still slowly grappling with how to design their rules and are well behind the U.S. in the
pace of their reforms.66e At such a formative moment, such guidance would effectively
define “the path forward.”

66d
66e

See Ferrarini & Saguato, supra note 8, at 328.
See CFTC & SEC, Joint Report on International Swap Regulation at 100 & n.429,

Jan, 31, 2012, available at
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II. The Volcker Rule and Structural Reform
The so-called Volcker Rule is a prophylactic provision of the Dodd-Frank Act
that broadly prohibits “banking entities” from “engaging in proprietary trading” or
“acquiring or retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or
sponsoring a hedge fund or private equity fund,” subject to a number of exceptions.72
The statutory language of the Dodd-Frank Act applies to both (i) U.S. bank holding
companies and their affiliates, and (ii) non-U.S. bank holding companies licensed to do
business in the United States,73 but it exempts trading that “occurs solely outside of the
United States” when the banking entity is not controlled “directly or indirectly” by a U.S.
banking entity.74 Thus, a foreign bank with even a single branch in the United States is
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/file/dfstudy_isr_013112.pdf.
[ER 11]
72

See Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act. This provision adds a new Section 13 to the

Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq.). The provision will be
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851. The quoted language in the text is in Section 13(a)(l)(A)
and (B).
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Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act uses the term “banking entity,” which is defined in

Section 13(h)(1) of the Banking Holding Company Act to include any company that is
treated as a bank holding company for purposes of Section 8 of the International Banking
Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. § 3106) and any affiliate or subsidiary thereof. See Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 § 13(h)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq.
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Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, and Section 13(d)(1)(H) thereof permits
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subject to the Volcker Rule, unless it can establish that a particular trading decision
occurred “solely outside of the United States.” To this extent, the Volcker Rule
effectively does apply extraterritorially, because at a minimum it requires banks with
U.S. branches to undertake significant compliance obligations to assure themselves their
trading stays well outside the United States.
In principle, U.S. financial regulators could have potentially pursued a
“substituted compliance” approach with respect to the Volcker Rule, but they did not—
probably for a variety of reasons. Instead, when financial regulators jointly issued their
final version of the Volcker Rule in December, 2013, they elaborately expanded on this
“solely outside of the United States” test.75 Under the final rule, a foreign banking entity
must satisfy the following conditions:
“[p]roprietary trading conducted by a banking entity . . . provided that the trading occurs
solely outside of the United States and that the banking entity is not directly or indirectly
controlled by a banking entity that is organized under the laws of the United States or of
one or more states.” Dodd-Frank Act § 619, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1625. Under
the final rule, a transaction originated in the United States, but executed in Europe, by a
foreign bank would not thus qualify under the “solely” test. See SEC Release No.
BHCA-1, supra note 25, at 421–24.
75

The initial version of the Volcker Rule was jointly proposed on October 11, 2011 by

the Department of the Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission. See Press Release, “FDIC Board Passes Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
on Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests In, and
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i.

The banking entity (including any personnel that arrange, negotiate
or execute the purchase or sale) may not be located in the U.S.;

ii.

The banking entity (including any relevant personnel) that make
the decision to purchase or sell may not be located in the U.S. or
organized under the laws of the U.S. or of any state;

iii.

The purchase or sale is not accounted for, directly or on a
consolidated basis, by any branch or affiliate that is located in the
U.S. or organized under the laws of the United States or of any
state;

iv.

No financing for the transaction is provided by any branch or
affiliate located in the U.S. or organized under the laws of the
United States or of any state; and

v.

The purchase or sale is not conducted through any U.S. entity
(with certain limited exceptions).76

Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds” (Oct. 11, 2011), available at
www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2011/pr11160.html; Department of the Treasury, Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, 12 C.F.R. Part 44, Docket No. OCC–2011–0014,
RIN: 1557–AD44, “Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading And Certain
Interests In, And Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds” at 3; 76
Fed. Reg. 68,846 (Nov. 7, 2011). [ER 12] The final rule was adopted on December 10,
2013. See SEC Release No. BHCA-1, supra note 25.
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See SEC Release No. BHCA-1, supra note 25, at 421–23.
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Unlike the CFTC’s and SEC’s OTC regulations, the Volcker Rule’s legal foundation
rests on a combination of inherent sovereignty and territorialism. In its view, the U.S.
regulates its own banks, even when they act abroad (i.e., an assertion of national
sovereignty), but it oversees foreign banks only when they are acting on U.S. soil (i.e., a
territorial approach). If the institution is not a U.S. bank and all the attributes of the
trading transaction occur abroad, it is beyond the scope of the Volcker Rule, and
functional equivalence between U.S. law and foreign law becomes irrelevant. This
restricted approach was not inevitable; indeed, one can imagine cases where this
territorial approach may be seriously underinclusive. For example, a bank chartered in
Europe could have 45% of its operations in the United States (and extensive
commitments to U.S. counterparties) and could permissibly engage in significant
proprietary trading in Europe, which would be exempt from the Volcker Rule, but this
trading could cause it to fail. Its failure could then destabilize its U.S. counterparties, but
this risk has been accepted by the Volcker Rule.
Viewed from a distance, the puzzle here is why did banking regulators follow an
entirely different approach towards defining the extraterritorial application of U.S. law
than did securities and derivatives regulators. An initial reason was probably caution.
The Volcker Rule was greeted with both hostility and skepticism in Europe. As the chief
executive of the Institute of International Bankers objected, the original proposed version
of the Volcker Rule would “reach far beyond the shores of the U.S. and apply . . . to all of
the global activities of every foreign bank that maintains even so much as a small branch
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in the U.S.”77 Similarly, Michel Barnier, the European Commissioner for Internal Market
and Services, has insisted that it is not “acceptable that U.S. rules have such a wide effect
on other nations.”78 Broad extraterritorial application of the Volcker Rule might then
have ignited a political firestorm.
Second, history counts. Substituted compliance is a new concept for banking
regulators —one into which they have never bought. Traditionally, banking regulators
view banking as an activity which can only be conducted within the terms of a license
given by the state. In contrast, for securities regulators, trading (including in OTC
derivatives) is something that anyone can do and does not require a special license.79
Also, banking regulators understandably view bank failure as a serious event, one
77

See Sally Miller, Letter to the Editor, Why Non-U.S. Regulators Are Not Happy with

the “Volcker Rule,” FINANCIAL TIMES, February 21, 2012, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/50d2c224-58b5-11e1-b9c600144feabdc0.html#axzz2uGPlXRHw. Ms. Miller is the chief executive officer of the
Institute of International Bankers. See id.
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See Yalman Onaran, “Bank Lobby Widened Volcker Rule, Inciting Foreign Outrage,”

BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2012), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0223/banks-lobbied-to-widen-volcker-rule-before-inciting-foreigners-against-law.html.
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Of course, brokers must be licensed, but a broker is defined as “any person engaged in

the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.” See
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c. Active engagement in
trading requires no license; only acting as agent for others in executing transactions
requires one to be a licensed broker.
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outweighing the insolvency of a broker-dealer because of likely greater externalities, and
so they have taken a broader view of their entitlement to regulate their banks’ activities
on a global basis.
Third, it is questionable whether any functional equivalent exists to the Volcker
Rule in Europe (without which it is pointless to discuss substituted compliance). The
Volcker Rule is a uniquely American innovation that was not part of the package of
reforms agreed upon by the G-20 nations (whereas clearinghouses, exchanges, and
margin for OTC derivatives were central parts of that jointly agreed package).74a
This conclusion can be debated. As legal realists might expect, functional
equivalence may lie in the eye of the beholder. Europe has in fact developed a
functionally similar (but far from equivalent) structural protection that parallels the
Volcker Rule. Known as “ring-fencing,” this safeguard limits who within banks may
engage in proprietary trading.74b In February, 2012, E.U. Commissioner Michel Barnier
appointed a High-Level Expert Group on structural bank reform.80 Chaired by Erkki
Liikanen, it held hearings, consulted broadly, and issued its final report in October, 2012
74a

See Greene & Potiha, Examining the Extraterritorial Reach of Dodd-Frank’s Volcker

Rule, supra note 13, at 272–74 (explaining the G-20’s usual approach to extraterritorial
financial regulation).
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See id. at 301–03 (discussing how European regulators were considering measures

that do not allow retail banking deposits to be used for certain investments).
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See FINAL REPORT OF HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON REFORMING THE STRUCTURE OF

THE E.U. BANKING SECTOR

i (Oct. 2, 2012) (Letter from the Chairman setting forth the

history of the report) [hereinafter “Final Report of High-Level Expert Group”].
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(which, of course, became known as the “Liikanen Report”). That report concluded “that
it is necessary to require legal separation of certain particularly risky financial activities
from deposit-taking banks within a banking group.”81 According to its chairman, the
objective of such reform was:
“to make banking groups, especially their socially most
vital parts (mainly deposit-taking and providing financial
services to the non-financial sectors in the economy), safer
and less connected to high-risk trading activities and to
limit the implicit or explicit stake of taxpayer [sic] in the
trading parts of banking groups.”82
Specifically, the Liikanen Report recommended that “proprietary trading and other
significant trading activities should be assigned to a separate legal entity if the activities
to be separated amount to a significant share of a bank’s business.”83 Thus, in theory,
failure of the trading subsidiary would not imperil the deposit-taking bank. This is both
broader and narrower in scope than the Volcker Rule because it applies to all trading (i.e.,
non-proprietary trading as well) and other risky activities,84 but it still permits the
banking group to engage in some trading and contains a de minimis exclusion if the level
of risky trading is low.

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Id. at iii.

84

Id. at iv–vi. (describing other “risky financial activities” that would have to be

segregated in a ring-fenced subsidiary, including derivatives and “certain other activities
closely linked with securities and derivatives markets”).
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This idea of “ring-fencing” the deposit-taking financial institution has been taken
the farthest in the U.K. There, the U.K.’s Independent Commission on Banking (“ICB”)
recommended in 2011 that large U.K. banks should ring-fence their retail bank operations
into separate legal subsidiaries with their own prudential safeguards.85 The ring-fenced
retail subsidiary would take deposits and engage in normal retail banking activities, but it
would be generally prohibited from engaging in most other forms of risk-taking activity.
Although the Liikanen Report has not yet produced any legislation seeking to codify it,
the U.K.’s ICB report has been strongly supported in the U.K., with the U.K. government
committing to have all necessary legislation in place by 2015.86
Real differences separate these ring-fencing proposals from the Volcker Rule.
Both the ICB and Liikanen proposal seem primarily concerned with protecting customer
deposits and thereby averting the need for a taxpayer-financial bailout.81a Thus, they are
prepared (to varying degrees) to allow the overall banking group to take on high risk
activities, provided that customer deposits are protected. In contrast, the Volcker Rule
seems intended to protect the “too big to fail” financial institution from insolvency,
possibly on the ground that its failure might initiate a chain of falling dominoes among
highly interconnected institutions that could topple the financial system as a whole. Also,
85

Id. at 85–86 (describing the history of the ICB proposal and the U.K. reaction to it).
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Id. at 86. Although the legislation would be fully in place by 2015, full compliance

would not be required until 2019. See id.
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See id. at 88 (discussing the European regulatory approach, which seeks to protect

“small-and-medium sized enterprises” and individual citizens by ensuring that banks are
“capable of financing the real economy”).
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proponents of the Volcker Rule may suspect that the deposit-taking bank might find ways
to support its securities trading affiliate (to its own detriment), even if it could not
guarantee the latter’s obligations. Thus, although these ring-fencing proposals have
similar aims to the Volcker Rule, they are less prophylactic and far from equivalent in
their purposes or prohibitions.
Nonetheless, despite all these differences, it is not inconceivable that banking
regulators could at some point accept the idea of substituted compliance. For a variety of
reasons, this seems at least plausible.87 If they did accept the concept, and deemed “ring
fencing” to be “functionally equivalent” to the Volcker Rule, this would permit covered
U.S. financial institutions to shift their proprietary trading to London and place it in a
separate subsidiaries that would be “ring-fenced” from their deposit-taking arm. The
consequences would then be dramatically different. For example, for institutions such as
Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley that do not operate as standard commercial banks or
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The Federal Reserve is particularly internationally minded and has long negotiated

“soft law” standards with respect to topics such as capital adequacy at banks. See, e.g.,
BASEL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK, FEDERALRESERVE.GOV,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/basel/default.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
They also may not want to be caught in the position of having to enforce a “rigid”
Volcker Rule that tolerated no exceptions. Hence, they may be open to the idea of
“substituted compliance,” even if they might demand more than the SEC before they find
“functional equivalence.” [ER 13]
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generally take deposits,88 little, if any, changes from their prior practices and business
models would be required of them under either the ICB or Liikanen proposals. Under
such a legal regime, compliance with the U.K.’s rules would mean that a Morgan Stanley
or Goldman Sachs was in compliance with the U.S. law under the doctrine of substituted
compliance, at least if all their proprietary trading was moved to the U.K. To be sure,
under the Liikanen Report’s proposed standards, Morgan Stanley or Goldman Sachs
might have to place their proprietary trading operations into a separate subsidiary that
would be ring-fenced from its other operations. This would be more costly, but it would
be feasible. All in all, this example shows how broadly the concept of substituted
compliance could reach and how subversive it could be to be the goal of prudential bank
supervision (that is, if it were read to allow U.S. banks to escape the Volcker Rule89).
88

Goldman Sachs does have a small commercial bank which is licensed to operate in the

U.K. See Ambereen Choudhury, Goldman Sachs Gets U.K. Approval to Operate Bank
Unit, BLOOMBERG, April 17, 2013, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201304-17/goldman-sachs-gets-u-k-approval-to-operate-bank-unit.html. However, Goldman
might be willing to either dispose of this unit or “ring fence” it if doing so permitted it to
engage in proprietary trading in the U.K.
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In fairness, a distinction can be drawn here between various types of “ring fencing.” If

all that is done is to segregate the deposit-taking arm of the financial institution (but the
rest of a systemically significant financial institution is exposed to the risks of proprietary
trading), then the Volcker Rule and “ring fencing” are not by any means functionally
equivalent. Alone, the Volcker Rule seeks to protect the solvency of the systemically
significant institution (and not just its deposit-taking arm). But if “ring fencing” were to
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To sum up, although it is possible to make plausible arguments that all three
approaches (the U.S.’s Volcker Rule, the U.K.’s ICB proposal, and the Liikanen Report)
have similar aims, they are not functionally equivalent, because the Volcker Rule alone
bars the parent entity from taking on specified risks (while the other two proposals
demand only that depositors be protected).84a Nonetheless, one can imagine the banking
industry arguing that these different legal regimes should be deemed functionally
equivalent. That frames the next and last question: How strict do systemic risk rules
have to be to work? Can valid distinctions be drawn between securities and banking
regulations in terms of the extraterritorial application of these rules?
III. Is There Excessive Extraterritoriality in Dodd-Frank? Does U.S. law need to
sweep as broadly as it seems to do under Dodd-Frank? To this point, this Essay has
argued that U.S. financial regulators need to have jurisdiction over the off-shore activities
of the subsidiaries and affiliates of U.S. financial institutions. Banking authorities clearly
have such authority, but securities and derivatives regulators are under great pressure to
defer to the host country regulator under a “substituted compliance” rationale. But U.S.
law sweeps even more broadly than that, as the Dodd-Frank Act sometimes applies to

require that the unit that engages in proprietary trading be isolated from the rest of the
financial institution (with no direct or even implicit guarantees from parents or affiliates),
then the case can be made that the two regimes achieve much the same result—and are,
loosely speaking, equivalent. Negotiations between the U.S. and the U.K. could focus on
how large this segregated unit that engaged in proprietary trading could be.
84a

See Final Report of High-Level Expert Group, supra note 75, at 87–88.
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foreign firms with U.S. branches and to the counterparties of U.S. financial institutions as
well.84b Is this necessary?
Although the 2008 crisis certainly underlined the dangers of off-shore activities,
the most vivid illustration of these dangers —AIG’s failure84c

—

should not be overread.

Anxiety-raising as the AIG example is, it can be used to prove too much. On closer
inspection, it shows only that an unregulated counterparty dealing in swaps can cause a
financial meltdown. It does not show that the mere presence of a foreign bank in the U.S.
through a branch office justifies conferring on U.S. regulators worldwide supervisory
jurisdiction over the foreign bank.
More generally, a basic distinction surfaces here: the prospect of a potential
“tragedy of the commons” is far less likely in this context of the Volcker Rule than in the
context of OTC derivatives trading. Why? In economic terms, a defining characteristic
of a “tragedy of the commons” is that an actor can escape having to internalize costs that
it imposes on others. Thus, a nation that offers unregulated trading in derivatives satisfies
this condition to the extent that it will not bear the costs of financial contagion, but can
profit by offering a dangerous “financial casino” to the world. In contrast, no nation can
escape the costs of its own banks failing. If a nation permits its leading financial
institutions to engage in a risky activity (such as, for example, proprietary trading), it
must internalize the costs of the eventual failure of those institutions. This is very
84b

See Greenberger, supra note 4, at 968–69 (discussing Dodd-Frank’s regulation of

counterparties for swap transactions).
84c

See Sjostrom, supra note 7, at 986–89 (discussing AIG’s ability to pursue off-shore

transactions due to a lack of regulation).
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different from a jurisdiction simply permitting foreign third parties to trade within its
territory (which may result in increased revenue as a result of regulatory arbitrage, but no
costs to that jurisdiction, even in the event of a financial failure). To illustrate, the
Cayman Islands could, for example, permit foreign banks to trade swaps at low cost on
its soil without posting margin or segregating collateral, but even it must regulate its own
banks (or suffer the consequences). Hence, we should not expect that, absent
extraterritorial regulation by the U.S., foreign banks will go unregulated. Indeed,
Europe’s decision to “ring-fence” its banks shows this. From this perspective, the U.S.
may be justified in prohibiting the affiliates and subsidiaries of U.S. banks from engaging
in proprietary trading abroad, but it has much far less justification in seeking to preclude
foreign banks from doing so. At most, it can assert that proprietary trading within the
U.S. endangers its interests. Thus, the more limited reach of the Volcker Rule with
respect to foreign banks may be justified.
Put differently, all nations have to worry about whether their own banks will fail.
But they need not worry about the failure of a foreign financial institution simply because
it operates on their soil, unless its failure will injure domestic counterparties. The historic
mistake in the AIG story was the failure to recognize that its insolvency could injure
counterparties worldwide. But that is the exception, not the rule (as next explained).
Precisely because all nations have to internalize the costs of their own banks failing, there
is less of a public goods problem here that could justify U.S. rules regulating offshore
proprietary trading by a foreign bank simply because it has some presence in the U.S.
A second and independent justification also supports this distinction between
OTC swaps trading and proprietary trading and further explains why the AIG example
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was the exception and not the rule. Realistically, it is only in the context of over-thecounter trading (and particularly the trading of long-term contracts, such as credit default
swaps) that the failure of a foreign counterparty seems capable of causing the failure of
the domestic financial institution that is its counterparty. In contrast, most proprietary
trading in equities will occur on exchanges. Around the world, such trading is already
cleared through clearinghouses (or similar institutions) that eliminate (or at least mitigate)
the counterparty risk.84d The distinctive feature about swaps was the absence of a
clearinghouse or exchange, with the result that counterparty risk was a serious problem.
This was the factor that made AIG’s collapse so devastating and required a bailout. Even
after Dodd-Frank, counterparty risk survives in the case of OTC trading, at least when the
swap is too customized to be cleared or traded on an exchange. Thus, in the context
addressed by Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, counterparties could impose potentially
bankrupting losses on a U.S. financial institution, but that same scenario is far less likely
in the case of proprietary trading where the counterparty risk is minimal. As a
generalization, in the case of proprietary trading, the securities may be risky to their
owner, but one counterparty’s failure seldom, if ever, could destroy the other, at least
when an exchange stands between them. Thus, the U.S. has much less of a need to
regulate the foreign counterparty in the context of proprietary trading.

84d

See Luettringhaus, supra note 26, at 20 (“[S]tandardized exchange-traded derivatives

contracts are transparent with regard to pricing, volume, the parties involved and their
respective positions . . . . [and] are subject to initial and variation margin requirements . . .
.”
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To return to a central theme, the key to the public goods problem in the
international context is that some jurisdictions need not internalize the costs of a financial
contagion. In the OTC derivatives context, a small nation may sponsor a dangerous
financial casino where all who trade are at risk. To be sure, we have not in the past have
witnessed such behavior by any nation, but that was because, before the passage of the
Dodd-Frank Act, swaps trading was essentially unregulated everywhere. For the future,
such a scenario of smaller nations offering “financial casinos” because they face little
downside risk remains plausible—unless the major players (i.e., the U.S. and the E.U.)
bar their own financial institutions from trading in them. Nonetheless, once we move
outside this context of OTC derivatives, the U.S. has less reason to regulate foreign
counterparties. Unquestionably, the U.S. still has an interest in regulating the offshore
activities of its own banks (and their subsidiaries and affiliates). But, reckless activity by
a non-U.S. bank offshore (even though it has some presence in the U.S.) seems generally
unlikely to impose significant costs on the U.S., unless the scale of the foreign bank’s
activities in the U.S. is very large. Here, the Dodd-Frank Act may reach too far; indeed,
some have argued that the banking industry deliberately caused the overextension of the
Volcker Rule in a covert attempt to make the rule unenforceable.90
90

See “Bank Lobby Widened Volcker Rule, Inciting Foreign Outrage,”, supra note 73

(“U.S. banks pushed regulators to widen proposed restrictions on trading and hedge-fund
ownership by foreign firms, then encouraged governments around the world to complain
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Essay on this claim that banks sought to sabotage the Volcker Rule in this fashion.
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The bottom line then is that the case for the extraterritorial application of the
Volcker Rule to foreign banks is limited. It should extend only to the offshore activities
of U.S. banks (and their subsidiaries and affiliates)—and possibly to foreign banks with a
major presence in the U.S. Only to the extent that the counterparty’s failure can endanger
a U.S. institution does a basis exist (even under the statutory language of the Dodd-Frank
Act91) for the U.S. to bar the foreign entity from proprietary trading. Thus, even if the
foreign bank’s trading activities were planned and orchestrated in the U.S., they do not
seem likely to threaten the safety and soundness of the U.S.’s financial markets. All this
suggests that financial regulators largely got it right in defining the extraterritorial scope
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Even under Section 722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act, an extraterritorial application of

U.S. law is generally precluded unless the “activities” at issue either “(1) have a direct
and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States”
or “(2) contravene such rules or regulations as the Commission may prescribe or
promulgate as are necessary or appropriate to prevent evasion of any provision of this Act
. . .” In the case of the Volcker Rule, it is difficult to argue that either precondition is
satisfied simply because a foreign bank with a U.S. presence engages in some proprietary
trading. To illustrate, if a non-U.S. bank with a small branch office in the United States
engages in proprietary trading in Europe (with the order being originated in New York),
it seems self-evident that on this basis alone one cannot conclude that such trading will
have any “direct or significant connection with . . . or effect on” the U.S. Nor is it clear
that a rule against such trading outside the U.S. is needed to prevent “evasion” where no
U.S.-domiciled bank is a party to it.
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of the Volcker Rule as they did to cover U.S. banks globally, but foreign banks only on a
territorial basis.

IV. Conclusion: The Fissures Under the “Soft Law” Paradigm
War, said Clemenceau, is too important to be left to the generals. Once, financial
regulation was thought best left to independent and sophisticated technocrats, who
needed to be “protected from the distorting influences of politics.”92 Today, financial
regulation is proving too important to be left to the technocrats. As others have
described, the old model of independent technocratic expertise appears to be waning,
with the shift being towards “greater political involvement in post-crisis banking
regulation around the world.”93 With this shift, the traditional style of international “soft
law” is also coming under pressure. Once “soft law” standards were framed by
transnational regulatory networks, populated by independent technocrats, in which
elected governments participated to only a modest degree (if at all).94 This process
92
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formulating voluntary transnational norms, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law
in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 518 (1995); David Zaring,
Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563,
576 (2007–2008). See also Brummer, supra note 5, at 304–11 (analyzing international
financial law in light of the hard law/soft law dichotomy).
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typically framed broad general principles and suggested voluntary best practices, but its
output was not binding. Governments deferred to the makers of soft law for multiple
reasons, but indifference and more pressing matters rank high on this list of explanations.
Today, the plea for harmonization is increasingly invoked by, and has become the
most effective weapon of, those seeking to delay systemic risk reform. Harmonization is
no longer the neutral goal it once seemed. But the need for international collaboration
remains clear. This Article has suggested that the best compromise is minilateralism and
bilateral or small group negotiations. From this perspective, the initial question should
be: what is the minimum number of nations that need to agree? In the world of OTC
derivatives, an agreement between the United States and Europe would effectively
compell the rest of the world to conform to their agreed standards.
The dangers inherent in “substituted compliance” arise not simply because the
financial services industry wishes to escape confining regulation, but equally much
because nations move at different speeds. The U.S. has moved more quickly than Europe
(or other nations) to implement systemic risk reforms for a variety of reasons. Given the
more fragmented nature of Europe, a slower decision-making process was predictable
and will likely continue. Elsewhere, some nations may wish to see what the U.S. does
before they act; others may fear taking a bold position if the U.S. does not follow; still
others are just stalemated or indifferent. For all these reasons, the U.S. rules will
typically come first and remain stricter than those of other nations. Thus, when U.S.
regulators find that another jurisdiction’s rules are “functionally equivalent” for purposes
of substituted compliance, a significant margin will still likely persist between the
strictness of the U.S. rules and those of the other jurisdiction. At that point, an incentive
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arises for U.S. financial institutions to move operations and personnel to that other
jurisdiction to operate under its more relaxed and lower-cost regime. Over time, such
regulatory arbitrage will imply job loss and a decline in market share for the U.S.
The resulting injury to the U.S. is twofold: (1) to the extent its financial
institutions can operate under less strict rules abroad, it is more exposed to systemic risk;
and (2) jobs and operations will migrate from the U.S. In the past, the U.S. has
occasionally deregulated in the hopes of spurring job creation,95 but in this instance
deregulation uniquely implies job loss. Eventually, this loss may become pronounced,
but at that point the financial services industry will respond that the U.S. should
deregulate to reduce the disparity, in effect leveling down to the lowest common
denominator. Any such deregulation could place the U.S. back on the road to another
2008 financial crisis.
What then is the answer? A “minilateral” negotiation is more likely to reduce the
disparity between the rules of the U.S. and the other jurisdictions participating in the
negotiation. To be sure, this is an matter of degree, not kind. In contrast, a multilateral
approach that results in non-binding principles of soft law will likely give rise to a greater
disparity between the U.S.’s rules and the operative rules of other nations. Even worse,
agreement on broad (but empty) principles of soft law may oblige the U.S. to recognize
all those regimes that are in asserted compliance with those loose international standards
as qualifying for substituted compliance.

The leading recent example is the JOBS Act (an acronym for “Jumpstart Our Business
Startups”), which was passed in 2012. For a review, see Michael Guttentag, Protection From
What? Investor Protection And the JOBS Act, 13 U.C. Davis Bus. L. J. 207 (2013).
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A key virtue of the minilateral alternative is that, because the U.S. and the E.U.
effectively dominate derivatives trading, they would have the leverage to specify joint
criteria for derivatives trading. If they can agree, they could insist that their financial
institutions (and their offshore affiliates) not trade anywhere on a basis inconsistent with
their joint criteria. Here, “hard law” would vastly outperform “soft law.” As a second
step, they could take their agreed-upon criteria to bodies, such as the Financial Standards
Board and the G-20, where the major financial nations dominate.96 Here, minority vetoes
and holdouts are less likely to have an impact, and thus “soft law” could be better shaped.
Only as a final step should the issue be placed on the agenda of larger, global bodies
(where passive resistance by the likely “free riders” is more likely).
To sum up, there are two bad policy options: First, treating consensus as a
precondition to regulation arms the opponents of financial regulation with a powerful
weapon by which to seek still more delay.97 Second, deferring to the rules of other legal
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application of U.S. derivatives regulation to other countries that are presently working on
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systems simply because they are within a stone’s throw of those of the U.S. (as a policy
of “substituted compliance” may entail) will encourage both delay and regulatory
arbitrage. Predictably, U.S. market share will decline, and U.S. jobs will move abroad.
To avert this, the U.S. and E.U. need proactively to seek to shape a global consensus—
without awaiting its arrival as a prerequisite.
At present, it is clear that U.S. financial regulators do not really agree, but will not
acknowledge the inconsistency in their diverging approaches. On one hand, the SEC
favors (and the CFTC has belatedly accepted) a policy of substituted compliance. On the
other hand, the Federal Reserve Board continues to disdain or ignore this policy. Indeed,
the Federal Reserve Board has not only imposed the Volcker Rule on U.S. banks on a
worldwide basis, but it has also just insisted that large foreign banks meet the higher U.S.
standards on capital adequacy and leverage.98 Unlike the SEC or the CFTC, the Federal

their own complimentary derivatives regulatory regimes will result in a flight of swaps
activity away from U.S. banks overseas. . . .” Jim Hamilton, House Members urge SEC
and CFTC to Harmonize Derivatives Regulations both Domestically and Globally, JIM
HAMILTON’S WORLD OF SECURITIES REGULATION (Nov. 15, 2013, 9:30 AM),
http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2013/11/house-members-urge-sec-and-cftc-to.html.
This is an unsurprising example of the industry’s favorite tactic of insisting on delay and
complete consensus before regulation can become effective.
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On February 18, 2014, the Federal Reserve Board published a final rule (issued pursuant to
Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act) requiring large foreign banks to keep high levels of capital in
their U.S. units and to establish a U.S. intermediate holding company (which would be supervised
by the Federal Reserve Board) over those units if the foreign banking organization has $50 billion
or more in the United States. See Federal Reserve System, Regulation YY; Docket No. 1438
(RIN 7100-AD-86) (“Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank Holding Companies and Foreign
Banking Organizations”) (February 18, 2014). The rule further requires covered foreign banking
organizations to maintain more risk-absorbing capital and hold a minimum of 4% of total assets
in equity capital. See Isabel Gomez and Eyk Herring, “Deutsche Bank Will Cut Its U.S. Assets,”
The Wall Street Journal Europe, February 25, 2014 at p. 20. Predictably, the Fed’s action elicited
European opposition, but the Federal Reserve was unmoved. See Francesco Guerrera, “Current
Account: Banking on Move by Fed as Top Cop,” Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2014, at C-1;
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Reserve seems impervious to foreign pressure that it conform to international standards.99
Potentially, this could also cause some foreign financial institutions to flee the U.S.
market (again with consequent job loss), and that is why a minilateral approach (and
eventual common rules) is more desirable.
Congress seems equally inconsistent. On the one hand, it passed the JOBS Act in
2012 and substantially deregulated the federal securities laws to create jobs. But on the
other hand, it has pressured the CFTC to accept substituted compliance, even though it
will produce the migration of jobs and market share abroad. This inconsistency
approaches self-deception.
The cause of curbing systemic risk has no natural champion and many natural
enemies. One of the most commonly made observations about public goods is that they
tend to be underprovided (because those who use or rely on them can escape paying for

Ryan Tracy, “Fed Move Rattles Global Bank Talks,” Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2009 at p.
3 (quoting Michel Barnier that Fed action was “decidedly unilateral”).
99
In its February 18, 2014 order, the Federal Reserve Board did acknowledge that some
commentators had urged it to rely on a system of substituted compliance for foreign banking
organizations, but explained that under Section 165 it was instructed to focus on the foreign
banking organization’s activities in the U.S. and their potential impact on the U.S. financial
system. See Federal Reserve System, supra note 99, at Section IV (A)(4)(b), pp. 55–56. But this
argument applies equally well to the SEC and CFTC, as foreign regulators have not focused on
how swaps trading by U.S. and foreign swaps dealers might affect U.S. financial stability.
Why is the Federal Reserve uniquely able to maintain its independence and resist the
pressure for substituted compliance? Possibly, the Federal Reserve Board is more independent
because it is less accountable to Congress (which does not fund it). Alternatively, it also lent
heavily to shore up foreign banks in 2008 and may better perceive the risks. In addition, it is also
independent of other central banks. The Federal Reserve Board’s recent action with respect to
foreign banks was in sharp contrast to the recent decision by U.K. banking authorities to relax
their rules for foreign banks in order to attract them back to London. See Margot Patrick, “U.K.
Bank Regulator Poised to Change Approach to Regulating Foreign Banks,” Dow Jones
Institutional News, February 24, 2014.
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them).100 Protection against systemic risk is a public good, and, for the future, the great
danger is that it will be underprovided. In all likelihood, failure will not be caused by
forthright opposition to reform, but rather by delay, piecemeal compromise, and low
visibility decisions that eviscerate the formal rules. The public has a short memory, but
the industry never forgets.

100

For a representative such assessment, see Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas,

Artifacts and Facilities: Information As a Common Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS 111, 120 (2003) (noting that the temptation to free ride “will lead to a suboptimal
investment in improving the resource, monitoring use and sanctioning rule-breaking
behavior”). Here, this means too little resources will be committed to protecting against
systemic risk, including through law enforcement.
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